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Muslims and Khmer Theravada Buddhists. 
The “indigenous religions” of Vietnam incorporate many oc-
cult aspects (spirit mediums, spirit possession, divination, talis-
manic blessings, etc.) which make them seem “exotic” to outsid-
ers.  Some ceremonies involve elaborate costumes, pageantry 
and music (for the Caodai liturgical mass or Mother Goddess 
performances), while others --like Hoa Hao chanting of prayers 
-- are conducted without instrumental accompaniments and 
even without devotional decorations aside from the ubiquitous 
flowers and incense. Spirit communications are important in 
all these indigenous religions:  Caodaism receives its scriptures 
from a literary form of spirit mediumship, in which teachings are 
spoken (usually in verse) or written with a phoenix headed bas-
ket.  The “Mother Goddess” religion is performative, with spirit 
mediums embodying the spirits of great generals, ladies of the 
court, princesses and young princes and distributing gifts that 
carry blessings to the participants.  Hoa Hao Buddhism has its 
own scriptures received by the prophet Huynh Phu So, which 
provide Buddhist teachings in simplified language, making it 
more accessible to peasants and small scale merchants.
State Efforts at Secularization
After 1954 in northern Vietnam and after 1975 in southern Viet-
nam, the socialist government tried to “modernize” the country 
by stripping the traditional social order of its sacred character.  
Following Marxist-Leninist theory, the regime leaders believed 
that religion would naturally disappear once the means of pro-
duction were nationalized and modernized.  Many religious 
practices were considered “superstitious” and blamed for wast-
ing the time and money of the masses, who should turn their 
attention to nation building, education and increasing agri-
cultural and industrial production.  The general goal of secu-
larization was intensified in relation to religions like Caodaism 
and Hoa Hao Buddhism, which were considered “reactionary 
groups with some religious trappings” because of their history 
of clashes with communist forces in the past [Blagov 2001].
For a quarter century (1975-2000), most temples built by the 
followers of indigenous religions were closed. Few services were 
held, sometimes a few older women were allowed to guard the 
temple grounds, and the schools, clinics, orphanages and work-
shops associated with these groups were nationalized.  People 
who had Dao Mau home temples could have their statues and 
altars taken away if the sounds of ritual music were heard, so 
many people said they “worshipped in silence and in darkness.” 
Caodai religious leaders suggested a more introspective, medi-
tative practice, “turning in” rather than seeking to recruit new 
members or hold large ceremonies.
ietnam is sometimes described as a primarily Buddhist 
country (current government statistics estimate that there 
are 10 million Buddhists out of 78 million people) with a size-
able Catholic minority (6 million).  In addition to these two 
“world faiths” with foreign origins, there are also three increas-
ingly institutionalized “indigenous religions,” which have a long 
and troubled relationship with the state.  The use of this term is 
itself problematic in many ways, and the story behind this new 
category is an interesting one.  It is now used to apply to three 
specific groups, all of which have recently re-emerged into the 
national arena. Caodaism, founded in colonial Saigon in 1926, 
has 3.2 million followers and 1,300 temples, Hoa Hao Buddhism, 
founded in southwestern Vietnam in 1939, has 1.5 million follow-
ers (according to statistics at http://www.vietnamembassy.com), 
but leaders of these faiths estimate their real numbers at closer 
to 6 million and 3 million respectively.  Dao Mau (“Mother God-
dess religion”) is considered a “distinct subculture with cultural 
nuances varying locally,” so there is no official documentation 
of its followers [Ngó Đức Thịnh 2010], but recent ethnographic 
reports indicate it is expanding in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City.  It builds on traditional veneration of female divinities and 
heroes going back many centuries, but many specific ritual prac-
tices have developed more recently [Endres  2011; Phạm Quỳnh 
Phương2009; Fjelstad and Nguyễn 2006; 2011].
Caodaism is a syncretistic religion that seeks to bring “the 
gods of Europe” and the “gods of Asia” together in a conversation 
that can serve to heal the wounds of colonialism and establish a 
basis for mutual respect and dialogue.  Officially called Dai Dao 
Tam Ky Pho Do, “The Great Way of the Third Age of Redemption,” 
Caodaism combines millenarian teachings with an Asian fusion 
of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism and Roman Catholicism, 
an Asia-centric millenarian movement which developed in the 
context of anti-colonial resistance. Established in 1926, its earli-
est members were members of the urban educated elite in Sai-
gon.  In just a few years, Caodaism grew dramatically to become 
the largest mass movement in the French colony of Cochinchi-
na, with 20-25% of the people of South Vietnam converting to 
this new faith in the period from 1930-75 [Werner 1981]. 
Hoa Hao is a reformist, millenarian form of Buddhism estab-
lished in 1937, which is now the fourth largest religion in Viet-
nam (after Buddhism, Catholicism and Caodaism).  It has several 
temples in California and, like Caodaism, has also established a 
series of websites and now publishes histories and commen-
taries in Vietnamese in the United States.  Founded by a young 
prophet who preached simplicity and egalitarianism,  this new 
religion is, like Islam, opposed to the use of religious icons, and 
renounces the use of ancestral tablets and even images of the 
Buddha in its altars [Taylor 2001].  It developed in western Viet-
nam, perhaps influenced by minority communities of Cham 
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Vietnam was listed as a “country of particular concern” for 
reasons of religious freedom by Amnesty International (in 2000) 
and the US State Department (in 2004), but since that time there 
has been substantial change.  The reformation era “opening 
up” of Vietnam to the market economy (starting in 1986), and 
the normalization of relations with the US (in 1995) paved the 
way for new contact between exiled religious followers and the 
homeland.  In 2007, Vietnam joined the World Trade organiza-
tion and took various steps to show how religion was being re-
integrated into public life. 
Becoming “Indigenous”: A New View from the Viet-
namese State
In 2007, the official Religious Press of Hanoi published a book 
by Phạm Bích Hợp  [2007] titled The People of the Southern Re-
gion and Indigenous Religions, with a combination of interviews, 
surveys and ethnographic research concerning the southern 
millenarian religious movements known as Buu Son Ky Huong 
(“Strange Fragrance from the Precious Mountain”), Cao Dai (“the 
highest tower”) and Hoa Hao Buddhism (designating its village 
of origin). This new study expressed a more conciliatory govern-
ment attitude towards groups once designated as practicing 
“superstition” and “reactionary politics,” sanctioning them under 
the new and increasingly common description of these groups 
as “indigenous religions” (tôn giáo bản địa).  But the nature of this 
new sanction and its history raises a series of questions about 
what exactly could be meant by “indigenous,” and how it is being 
used in today’s Vietnam. 
The term “indigenous” has the general meaning of native, 
originating in and characterized by a particular region or coun-
try, and the Vietnamese term (bản địa) means quite literally 
“emerging from the land.”  A second sense given to the English 
term is innate, inherent, natural, which is rendered by another 
Vietnamese term often used in the book—bản sắc , which could 
be translated literally as the “true original colors,” and has taken 
on the modern meaning of “identity.”  This characterization is of-
ten used to designate the religious practices of ethnic minorities, 
who once inhabited the region but have now been displaced by 
larger groups who have migrated to the area.
All these “indigenous religions” are practiced primarily by 
ethnic Vietnamese (Kinh), who migrated to the region now 
known as southern Vietnam in the past 300 years.  They are not, 
therefore, the people who have the earliest historical connection 
to the land.  The southern region had been a part of the kingdom 
of Cambodia, inhabited by Khmer speaking people and various 
highland groups, many of them speakers of Austronesian lan-
guages.  Highland ethnic groups live primarily from hunting and 
swidden gardening, and so are often described as “indigenous 
minorities,” but it would be hard to use this label for the follow-
ers of “indigenous religions,” who are primarily agriculturalists, 
and include many traders, city residents, intellectuals and mem-
bers of the professional class.  Caodaism in particular originated 
among colonial civil servants, many of them of high rank, and 
was led by a number of wealthy landowners, businessmen and 
journalists. The Caodai pantheon is both syncretistic and cosmo-
politan, involving as it does the veneration of historical person-
ages not only from Vietnam, China and India (Trang Trinh, Lao 
Tzu, Confucius, Buddha) but also from France, Russia and Pal-
estine (Victor Hugo, Vladimir Lenin, Jesus Christ). So how could 
these belief systems come to be described as “indigenous”?
I think the labeling of these practices as “indigenous” reli-
gions is primarily a strategic one, which combines a recognition 
of regional traditions and a perception that the 1975 “reunifica-
tion” of Vietnam also had elements of an annexation and even 
subjugation of the peoples of the south who were supposedly 
“liberated.”  As part of an effort to normalize relations between 
religions and the state, this term revises earlier policies which 
had condemned Caodaism and Hoa Hao as “superstitious” or 
“heterodox” practices (mê tín), and allows their adherents to be 
seen as “mainstream” (chánh tin) religious believers. Scholars 
now speak of “folk beliefs” (tín ngưỡng dân gian) which were nev-
er fully absorbed into elite or official culture, what Philip Taylor 
calls “an unofficial counterculture that reflects the priorities of 
groups who have been excluded from state power” [Taylor 2006: 
10]. 
These more narrow definitions of the term suggest that 
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Spirit mediums cross gender lines,  with men embodying female spirits like  this  princess  in white,  and  women  embodying  fierce  mandarins  and  warriors.
Mediums can also be possessed by the ky lan, a chimerical dragon horse who is attended by masked servants.
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the relation between the Hanoi government and the “indig-
enous people of the south” might have been excluded from 
the dominant culture of the northern nation state.  These are 
claims sometimes made by southern leaders, even those who 
were themselves active in the National Liberation Front, who felt 
that reunification in 1975 did not in fact place the two formerly 
separated halves of Vietnam on an equal footing but resulted in 
a period during which all southerners, whatever their political 
convictions, were viewed as unreliable, and were not allowed to 
share evenly in their own new government.
The situation is somewhat different with Dao Mau, since it is 
a modern version of  spirit medium rituals long practiced in rural 
northern Vietnam. In the early 1990s, a number of Communist 
party leaders began to promote the idea of using cultural activi-
ties to foster traditional values, allowing practices once consid-
ered “superstition” to become “folk culture.”  Scholars associated 
with Ngó Đức Thịnh.’s Folklore Institute began to document the 
songs and dances of what was then known as the Four Palaces 
cult.  By highlighting the kinship between these practices and 
shamanism in other societies, these scholars were able to allow 
Dao Mau to be considered an indigenous folk religion (Đạo) and 
a “living museum” of Vietnamese culture.  The resurgence of 
popular religion was sanctioned by scholarly efforts to gain rec-
ognition for once suppressed traditional practices [Phạm Quỳnh 
Phương 2009; Endres 2011]. In the new market economy, these 
practices also became more attractive because they were said to 
promote health, confidence and entrepreneurial success.
Contrasting Narratives of Religion and Diaspora 
In an introduction to the edited volume Modernity and 
Re-Enchantment:  Religion in Post-revolutionary Vietnam, Philip 
Taylor outlines several ways in which contemporary religions 
can be understood in Vietnam [2006: 10-15].  While acknowledg-
ing the many conflicts between religious leaders and the current 
government, he concludes that it is wrong to overemphasize the 
role of the state, even if its control over publications means it can 
keep the “court transcript”:  “From time to time the official record 
is tactfully re-edited to find aspects of formerly censored or un-
noticed popular practice to be in conformity with state policy” 
[ibid. 2006: 14]. 
Two contrasting narratives have appeared in the 21st cen-
tury to make sense of the resurgence of popular religion in Viet-
nam and in the diaspora.  In Caodai communities in California, 
leaders of the religion have argued that they were fated to leave 
the country in order to globalize their faith [Hoskins 2006; 2009; 
2010; 2011].   In today’s Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), 
scholars and intellectuals argue that the “indigenous religions” 
of Vietnam should be recognized and reintegrated into the na-
tional fabric by emphasizing their ties to the regional culture of 
the South.  There is a paradox in the contrast between these two 
narratives:  In one, a local religious movement becomes “interna-
tional” and assumes the mission of a universalizing belief.  In the 
other, a syncretistic ideology is refocused on its local anteced-
ents and becomes “indigenous” in order to neutralize the politi-
cal controversies in which it was once entangled and tie it to the 
“traditional psychology” of southern Vietnam (Nam Bo) as the 
meeting place of a diverse and distinctive mix of cultures.  
Caodaism presents an Asian perspective on universal reli-
gion, and yet in many respects it is a very specifically Vietnamese 
perspective.  It deliberately evokes themes of exile, exodus and 
long distance nationalism, and uses a number of Biblical idioms 
to argue for the significance of Eastern religious philosophies in 
a world threatened by western domination. I often heard, for in-
stance, that the last time God spoke so directly to humanity be-
fore 1925 was when Moses received the Ten Commandments on 
Mount Sinai. Vietnamese refugees, who often spent several years 
“sponsored” by Bible Belt Protestant families, explicitly compare 
their experiences to those of the Jews cast out of Palestine, and 
inscribe their exile in a theological discourse with a strong mil-
lennial component.   This model is also adopted to some extent 
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by identifying with global Buddhist ideals.
Followers of Dao Mau use a different narrative strategy, 
since their origins in the north allow them to stress a less contro-
versial “patriotic loyalty to the fatherland.”  In the diaspora, many 
Vietnamese see themselves as exiled, and travel on pilgrimages 
to famous Mother Goddess temples in Nam Dinh.  They say that 
“Vietnam dances inside them” when they are possessed by the 
spirits.  Through embodied rituals, they conceptualize, map, in-
scribe and document their history.  Their worship of ancestors, 
heroes and saints is a way of practicing and developing a histori-
cal consciousness.  It is a selective history, and notably one which 
cuts out the conflicts of the 20th century entirely, but it is a par-
ticular method of re-connecting to a glorious past which they 
believe can provide guidance for living in a new homeland and 
navigating the generational divide [Fjelstad and Nguyễn 2006; 
2011; Hoskins in press].
 For immigrants and exiles, diaspora can be constructed as 
a narrative of “crossing and dwelling” [Tweed 2006], in which 
movement through space is given meaning by ideas of a tran-
scendent connection to “home,” making the longed for land of 
origin into a “holy land” (thánh địa) of universal importance.  This 
fusing of religious discourse and nationalist political goals is in 
fact not unusual in a post Cold War era in which the resurgence 
of religious politics has challenged the predicted triumph of 
secular nationalism.  As scholars rethink earlier trajectories that 
predicted that the “imagined community” of the faithful would 
inevitably be replaced by the nation state, we may come to see 
new diasporic formations as crucial to understanding the com-
peting ideologies of order of the 21st century.  While it seems 
ironic that the so-called “indigenous religions” have been revital-
ized in part because of diasporic communities, this is an emerg-
ing characteristic of a globalized world.
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The Caodai pantheon includes Lao Tzu, Buddha and Confucius in the top 
row, Quan Am (Kuan Yin), Li Pei and Quan Cong (Guan Yu) in the second 
row, followed by Jesus Christ in the third row and a figure of Vietnamese 
ancestor worship. 
A woman prays in the Caodai great temple at 
Tay Ninh, in front of images of the three me-
diums who first received teachings from the 
Jade Emperor (Cao Dai) in 1925-26.
Caodai dignitaries in red, yellow and turquoise 
robes kneel before the image of the left eye of 
God on a giant globe at the main altar in Tay 
Ninh.
7outheast Asia of the last two decades has experienced a 
cultural renaissance rooted in the growth of its economies 
and booming urban consumerism, and manifested in the mas-
sive circulation of popular culture products, such as movies, 
pop music, animation, comics, television programs, and fashion 
magazines, and their derivative products such as games, food, 
toys, accessories, etc. While many of these popular culture con-
fluences and “waves” originated in Europe and the United States, 
a significant proportion is produced and disseminated locally 
or regionally. Confluences of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
popular cultures, in particular, have not only intensified in recent 
decades reaching consumers of different national and linguistic 
boundaries, but have substantially decentralized this region’s 
popular culture market. The result is that in virtually every big 
city in Southeast Asia, it is possible to find a variety of imported 
popular cultural products, which are regularly disseminated, in-
digenized, hybridized, and consumed. 
These dramatic developments in Southeast Asia’s popular 
culture market have been well documented and analyzed in the 
existing literature, especially in anthropology and cultural stud-
ies. This literature provides substantial testimony for the prolif-
eration of the various popular culture confluences and contains 
rich information and analysis relating to the practice and “mean-
ing” of popular culture in an age of globalization. The focus is al-
most exclusively on the representational and ideological aspects 
of popular culture, in particular the consumption/reception and 
identification of, say, Asian TV dramas, anime or film. The over-
whelming majority of the studies, many of them employing a 
close reading of media-as-texts, are in fact of this kind. 
 Curiously, however, the study of popular culture has been 
relatively neglected within political science and economic dis-
ciplines, especially in relation to the processes of regionaliza-
tion. Very few studies have actually looked at the networks and 
mechanisms of distribution and consumption of popular cul-
ture in Southeast Asia, or examined the proximity they facilitate 
among companies and communities across this region. Given 
the dissemination of popular culture practices and products 
across the region, years before states began to take notice and 
media alliances began to be formed in order to take advantage 
of this, why has culture barely figured in the critical discussion on 
region-making? While ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) has emerged as a hub of Southeast Asia community-
building and to some extent norm-setting, its cultural impact as 
far as popular culture is concerned, has been far less visible. Why 
so? 
Popular Culture and Region-Making
Looking at the regional flow of popular culture in Southeast 
Asia, especially in cities, may advance our empirical and theo-
retical understanding of how regionalization actually works and 
more basically of what constitutes a “region.” 1 First, it overturns 
conventional wisdom on who the driving forces and actors of 
regionalization are. Such investigation redirects one’s attention 
away from the state and highly-institutionalized arrangements 
and looks instead on the agency involved in the creation and 
marketing of culturally oriented commodities. Examining the 
actual operations and networks which drive the dissemination 
and consumption of popular culture, not only reveals the bot-
tom-up logic of regionalization, but also illuminates the actual 
practices and processes of regionalization—the collaboration 
and interlinking of companies, the creation of transnational cul-
tural platforms, the distribution of products, and the (belated) 
policy initiatives of governments.
Secondly, popular culture may also play a constructive 
role in pulling people closer together by providing them with 
a shared experience invigorated by the consumption of cul-
tural commodities. The commodification, production, market-
ing,  pirating, and consumption of popular culture do not only 
encourage collaborations between companies and individuals 
involved in these processes, but also constructs new frameworks 
for delivering images, ideas, and emotions, which can invigorate 
feelings of proximity and belonging.  
There is very little doubt that popular culture creates a 
special bond or a special relationship and a shared experience 
between consumers. Given that a large number of people in 
Southeast Asia 
spend many hours 
every day in front 
of their television 
screens, go to mov-
ies, listen to music, 
and generally spend 
more than before on 
cultural consump-
tion, can we assume 
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Cosplay is a practice where 
youngsters gather dressed 
with the costums of their 
favorite anime chracters.  
These gatherings take place 
in every big city in East and 
Southeast Asia.
lifestyles. Japanese music artists, such as Hamasaki Ayumi and 
Utada Hikaru are widely known in the region. (Utada Hikaru has 
sold more than one million copies of her three albums over the 
last six years in Thailand alone!) Japanese television programs 
and animation series such as Doraemon, Tiger Mask, and Detec-
tive Conan have been constantly broadcast on public television 
and cable channels in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indo-
nesia, and Japanese comic publications (manga) are routinely 
translated into Thai, Bahasa, and Tagalog.  
Korean popular culture is also leaving a strong mark on 
Southeast Asia’s cultural scene, creating the Korean Wave, or Han-
ryu, as it is known among fans.  In less than a decade, South Ko-
rean television dramas, movies, music, and fashion have gained 
immense popularity throughout the region, adding a variety of 
new images and consumption opportunities. With a marketing 
strategy that mixes television exposure, commercials, and mu-
sic, South Korean idols have become phenomenally popular 
throughout the region. Won Bin and Song Seung-hun for ex-
ample, are widely known to young audiences for their parts in 
the hit television drama Autumn Fairy Tale (2000). Other famous 
South Korean idols that have become well known in the same 
way include Jang Dong-gun (Friend), Cha Tae-hyun (My Sassy 
Girl), Lee Jung-jae (Il Mare), Kyon Sang-woo (My Tutor Friend) and 
Bae Yong Jun (Winter Sonata). 
India’s Bollywood is another industry that success-
fully exports its movies to Southeast Asia, especially to rural 
areas.3 Bollywood produces over 800 new movies every year 
(that is more than double the number of feature films produced 
in the United States!), and together with its innovated music 
and fashion styles, exports massively to Southeast Asia. Theaters 
featuring Bollywood movies have become community foci for 
South Asians and a way for them to stay in touch with their cul-
ture. Bollywood movies and music are routinely offered in retail 
outlets in places like Singapore, Malaysia, and rural Indonesia. 
Otherwise, the diffusion of Indian popular culture in Southeast 
Asia is based on the reproduction and distribution of pirated In-
dian movies and music on CD, VCD, and DVD.
A few inner-Southeast Asian popular culture collaborations 
have been taking place, although still on a small scale. A good 
example is the recent success of the Singapore-made Mandarin 
drama serial The Little Nyonya (November 2008 - January 2009), 
which has been bought up and screened in Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Another example is Filipino 
movies that reach cities in other parts of the region, especially 
in places where Filipinos are working (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
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that these practices have an impact on their lives and percep-
tions? Perhaps they introduce new images and options and 
create new social and symbolic references? To use international 
relations scholar Andrew Hurrel’s term,2 can we think of popular 
culture, including practices and discourses over popular culture, 
as creating a sense of “we-ness”? 
In the case of Southeast Asia, it is possible that the circula-
tion of popular culture plays a constructive role in the process 
of region-making. This circulation has an impact not only on 
the institutional aspect of regional formation, e.g. the creation 
of transnational markets and the consequential collaboration 
between all those involved in this process (companies, agents, 
promoters, distributors, retailers, etc.), but also on the dissemi-
nation of lifestyle communalities and conceptions, which are 
based on the experience of consuming the same cultural prod-
ucts by different people in different places. In other words, the 
circulation of popular culture puts Southeast Asians, especially 
city residents, into a new cultural realm and invigorates a feeling 
of common-ness. The spread of popular culture may help peo-
ple in Southeast Asia to develop a common language made up 
of the same sounds, images, and texts available through music 
and DVD players, TV and movie screens, in comic publications, 
on commercial billboards, or via the Internet. These commodi-
ties and images do not have to be uniquely Southeast Asian, as 
long as they are shared by wide segments of the Southeast Asian 
population. Let us look at Southeast Asia’s popular culture mar-
ket more closely.
The Regionalization of Taste
In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, American popu-
lar culture continues to loom over the markets and its products 
are successfully marketed in places where local income levels 
have reached a certain standard. However, in spite of America’s 
strong position, regional popular culture confluences have de-
veloped and intensified, substantially decentralizing the world’s 
cultural structure and refuting the notion that Southeast Asia’s 
popular culture scene should continue to be dominated by 
American culture. Most visible are Chinese, Japanese, and Ko-
rean popular cultures, which have reached global audiences in 
Europe, North and South America, and even the Middle East, but 
their greatest visibility and impact still remains within the cultur-
al geography of East Asia (both Northeast and Southeast Asia). 
In Chinese popular culture, Beijing and Shanghai of the last 
two decades have evolved as incubator sites for Chinese cultural 
production, especially in animation, digital television, and video 
games, in spite of the state censorship that sometimes inter-
feres. Chinese pop music, in both Mandarin and Cantonese, is 
increasingly popular among young Chinese audiences through-
out Southeast Asia. Taiwan has recently replaced Hong Kong as 
the regional hub of Mandarin-language pop and is the source of 
approximately 80 percent of sales of Mandarin music worldwide. 
The culture and entertainment sections of local newspapers in 
Singapore, Bangkok, and Manila, constantly depict Chinese mu-
sic artists from across Asia making Pan-Asian Chinese pop cul-
ture a reality. 
During the past two decades, Japanese music, television 
programs, animation, and comics have carved out an integral 
position in Southeast Asian markets, introducing young con-
sumers to a variety of new consumption opportunities and 
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The Korean TV drama Winter Sonata
is perhaps the best representative
of the popularity of the so-called 
Korean Wave in East and Southeast 
Asia.
9Taiwan, etc.) To further complicate this movement of popular 
culture, there are Malaysian-born actors, directors and musicians 
who shoot to stardom in Taiwan and Hong Kong before they are 
recognized at home (actress Michelle Yeoh, singer Aniu, and di-
rector Tsai Mingliang being three examples).
These popular culture confluences and developments cre-
ate a new economy of products shared by a selective section 
of the population—especially young urban residents with an 
elevated standard of life. Increasingly for these people, cultural 
consumerism has become an integral way of life, which creates 
a bond with other people who share the same urban lifestyle. In 
this way, for a selected segment of the population consumerism 
of popular culture has become an important factor in value pro-
duction—not only in the economic sense but also in the social 
and cultural sense. 
As a result, Southeast Asian urban consumers today may 
have multiple popular culture preferences, deriving from mul-
tiple centers. Millions of youth in places like Singapore, Hanoi, 
Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Jakarta might covet the latest fash-
ions from Tokyo, listen to the same genre of American pop mu-
sic, watch Chinese dramas on television or DVD, read Japanese 
comic books, and go with friends to watch the latest Korean 
movies. Through the dissemination of popular culture, people 
from different places can, for example, watch a certain genre of 
animation program throughout their childhood and listen to the 
same genre of music as teenagers. They might then have a lot 
more in common than if these products were not available.
Implications for the Southeast Asian Region
A few important questions arise from the relations between 
popular culture and the regionalization process in Southeast 
Asia: Is popular culture a significant enough phenomenon to 
advance our understanding of a “region” in Southeast Asia? Is 
popular culture important enough to make people both within 
and outside of Southeast Asia feel distinct? Can we develop an 
alternative concept of a region based on the proliferation and 
acceptance of popular culture in Southeast Asia? 
The available literature on popular culture only partly ad-
dresses these questions. While cognizant of the region-specific 
cultural resonance and asymmetry of intra-Asian flow, the lit-
erature on popular culture in Southeast Asia was not able to 
offer adequate theorization of “region” as a unit of study and 
analysis or systematically explore the implications of popular 
culture for regionalization. However, the statistics on the export 
of Japanese and Korean TV programs, for example, suggest that 
there is a geographical reach, scope and limit to the networking 
and patterns of popular culture flow and consumption, but the 
geographical field tends to vary from one product to another, 
as does the density and directionality of this flow. The “region” is 
thus a convenient but notoriously slippery term, since Japanese 
and Korean popular culture flows have arguably less visibility in, 
say, the Indian market, than they do in Taiwan, China, and the 
major cities of Southeast Asia.4
Nevertheless, a few conspicuous features can be discerned 
from looking at the dissemination and acceptance of popu-
lar culture across Southeast Asia. First, market forces (and not 
governmental policies or institutional arrangements) are at the 
heart of the process, promoting and spurring the construction 
of new cultural linkages. The dissemination of popular culture 
in Southeast Asia is essentially the result of bottom-up process-
es not directly guided by the state—and at times even taking 
place in spite of it. Second, the dissemination of popular culture 
is centered on cities and their middle class residents rather than 
encompassing the entire population as a whole. In this sense, 
the regionalization process in Southeast Asia is fragmented: only 
a certain part of the population (overwhelmingly urban middle 
Japanese Music CDs in Singapore
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classes) are more “regionalized” than those who live in rural areas 
as they are more exposed to the transnational flow of popular 
culture. Insofar, the arising connective-ness between cities and 
people is not an equal process, but a socially selective one. Third, 
given the cross-regional flow of popular culture, the Southeast 
Asian region is not isolated from the economic and cultural de-
velopments in the wider East Asian region and in global markets. 
Nevertheless, there is a concentration of certain popular culture 
flows and influences found only in the cultural geography of 
East and Southeast Asia.  
   The “region,” as seen from the perspective of popular cul-
ture, is thus not simply a convenient, delimiting marker or a 
geographical field of inquiry. It cuts across the boundaries that 
separate “East Asia” (i.e., Northeast Asia) from “Southeast Asia.” 
Moreover, it is not merely a collection of nation states as a whole 
but essentially the product of the economic, societal, and cultur-
al inter-penetration among Southeast Asia’s big cities and their 
consumer-oriented middle class population. The dissemination 
and acceptance of popular culture may also introduce a new 
meaning to the concept of “community” as not only a group of 
people living under the banner of the nation state or belonging 
to a certain ethnicity or religion, but also urban residents living in 
different cities in different countries bound by certain behaviors 
and practices encouraged by the inflow and practice of popular 
culture. This definition, however, is far from consensual because 
it implies that this process creates large swathes of excluded 
populations that are not a part of the emerging urban popular-
culture consumer culture.
In sum, conceptualizing a region in Southeast Asia based on 
popular culture requires going beyond the conventional tools 
provided by geographers and scholars of international relations 
and requires a methodologically pluralistic approach open to 
considering a variety of socially and culturally embedded prac-
tices and behaviors which may affect regional formation. It may 
also require some amount of imagination and courage to define 
regions in new ways. 
Notes
1 In “regionalization,” I refer to an indirect and bottom-up pro-
cess that increases the proximity between markets, institu-
tions, and communities, in geographical and conceptual 
domains wider than two states.
2 Hurrell, Andrew. Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in 
Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.) Regionalism in 
World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
p. 65.
3 Bollywood, it should be noted, does not only refer to the 
Mumbai-based movie industry but is also a common name 
given to a wider cultural phenomenon including a range 
of production and consumption activities including music, 
dance, and fashion.
4 I thank Caroline Hau for raising this point.
Japanese film festival in Bangkok.Fashion magazines are on of the ways cultural influences and style spread across the region.
Mao and Doraemon — historical dramas are also a 
part of the growing popular culture market.
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Cambodia in the 1970s witnessed one of the most turbu-lent periods of its history. In March 1970, the country was 
plunged into civil war and was ruled by Democratic Kampuchea, 
also known as the Pol Pot regime, between1975-79. The regime 
declared the destruction of existing society and culture and 
implemented policies that decimated the population. Its revo-
lutionary policies were based on a totalitarian ideology, which 
aimed to improve the existence condition of its people. Yet, the 
aftermath of the revolution was misery, resulting in the sacrifice 
and loss of over 1.5 million lives.
At the end of the 1990s, preparations began for the trial of 
the leaders of the Pol Pot regime, twenty years after its fall. It was 
the international community, and not the Cambodian govern-
ment, that took the initiative to charge its remaining leaders. 
From the outset of the trials, the present government, led by the 
former cadres of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodian People’s Party, 
emphasized the sensitivity of the issue. According to what was 
repeatedly heard by the government in discussions with the UN 
and donor countries, the trial held the risk of severely disrupt-
ing Cambodian society’s political reconciliation, initiated after 
the national election in 1993, one that marked the end of a two-
decade conflict. Negotiations at various levels consumed a lot of 
time and money, yet finally in July 2010 the international tribunal 
in Phnom Penh handed down a 35-year sentence to the former 
director of the political criminal relocation center that claimed 
14,000 lives during the Pol Pot period. Presently, a second trial of 
four suspects is being fought over in court. 
However, after conducting fieldwork in a Cambodian village 
for two years in 2000-02, I have doubts about the way past trials 
handed down their judgments. In this article, I would briefly like 
to make clear that there were problems with the way in which 
those accused of perpetrating crimes against humanity were la-
beled through the dichotomies of “good” and “evil,”  “victims” and 
“victimizers.” We must understand the significance of these trials 
in popularizing the judiciary system in contemporary Cambodi-
an society and also recognize the important role these played in 
“excavating” and bringing to light facts on the leadership of the 
Pol Pot regime. Yet, what needs to be made clear is that we need 
to be conscious that the trials alone will not help us understand 
the crucial issues that affect the lives of Cambodian people after 
the turmoil. The Cambodian government’s propaganda, which 
has focused on the weakness of so-called reconciliation, one 
based on the dichotomy of “victims” and “victimizers”, is absurd 
for it is nothing more than political rhetoric, and does little to 
uncover what really took place in society at the time.
A Village Situation
In December 2000, I started to live in a village located in Kam-
pong Thum province, a central part of Cambodia, and it was 
there that I found plenty of evidence of the tragedy that took 
place in the recent past. In interviews with villagers, the memory 
of the departed who were taken away by the revolutionary or-
ganization was a topic that people often discussed.  The ruins 
of Buddhist buildings in rural temple compounds remained in a 
state of disrepair. It was impossible to estimate the influence of 
the effects of the Pol Pot regime on the villagers just by looking 
at them. However, there was no doubt that the effects of that 
regime had been an extraordinary experience and were instru-
mental in bringing about various changes to Cambodian soci-
ety.
During fieldwork interviews in every household in the vil-
lage, I uncovered concrete examples of that victims experienced 
at the hands of totalitarian rule. For example, there was a skinny 
but cheerful man near the house where I lived. Born in the village 
in 1945, he had six siblings, five brothers and one sister. During 
the period of the regime he lost his father, four brothers and one 
sister. Apart from himself, only one younger brother survived. 
According to him, his father, who lived with him in 1975, had 
been taken away and killed by the revolutionary organization in 
1977 without any explanation or charge. Before 1975, the eldest 
brother was a teacher at a school in the provincial capital, while 
the second was a medical doctor and working in Phnom Penh, 
and the fourth was studying in Phnom Penh. All three were relo-
cated to the province located in the western part of the country 
after 1975 and then killed. In addition, the younger sister who 
was in the village was stricken with fever and died in 1978 with-
out any medial treatment. He told me his “Stomach was boiling” 
(“kdav poh” in Khmer, literally meaning extremely angry) when 
he thought of the family that he lost during this period.
However, although the life story of this man may remind us 
of the familiar image of the regime that ruled its society through 
fear, one of his neighbors had a very different life history from 
this period. One woman, born in the village in 1945, three doors 
down from the man’s house, related that she had joined the 
communist movement in 1972 and married a male comrade in 
1974. During the Pol Pot period she had lived in Phnom Penh. 
After she moved there in 1975, she asked the revolutionary orga-
nization to relocate her parents and three brothers in the village 
to the city. Then, she escaped to a western part of the country by 
boat after the fall of the regime in January 1979 and divorced her 
comrade in June 1979. At first, she moved to her mother’s home 
village in Kampong Cham, and finally returned to the village in 
1980. She lost contact with all three of her young brothers who 
had worked in the city in 1979.
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Such contrasting life stories could be found in the vicinity 
of the village and point to the real situation of village society in 
Cambodia where people shared a diversity of experiences under 
the then regime. However, more interestingly and importantly, 
as far as I observed during fieldwork in the villages, there was no 
case of ostracism through criticism of others for their behavior 
under the regime. What I want to be clear on is that the differ-
ence in people’s experiences during this period did not become 
a source of division in the community. This has led me to ask seri-
ous questions about the efficacy of using dichotomies to refer to 
the roles that people had during the period.
The “Communists” and the Dead
Ultimately, how many villagers did join the communist move-
ment initiated by Khmer Rouge in the first half of the 1970s? 
The communist activities had surely reached the locality in the 
1960s, and the area had come under the control of communists 
since March 1970. These communists initiated propaganda ac-
tivities in the region in 1972, sending their young cadres to every 
village to sing and dance in front of villagers. By then, a group of 
young villagers, who became enthralled by the seductive mes-
sage, decided to leave villages and join the movement. 
At the time of my research in the early 2000s, there were 189 
couples in 149 households in the village. 79 couples had married 
before 1979. From this sample, I extracted 87 nuclear family units 
who had lived in the village before 1975 by examining the infor-
mation from 79 couples’ close relatives. And finally, by reviewing 
the information of all the family members of 87 nuclear family 
units, I found that 28 of 87 units had members who had joined 
the revolution in the beginning of the 1970s. 10 out of 28 cases 
had two family members who had joined the movement. This 
indicates that 32 percent of village households at that time had 
members who participated in the revolution as “communists.” 
The assessment of this result is open to dispute, but I believe it 
may illustrate, to a certain degree, the general characteristic of 
Cambodian rural communities; the everyday life of local resi-
dents at the time had very close relations with the “communists.” 
On the other hand, there were a number of villagers who 
died due to starvation, disease and murder. I estimated the 
number of those who disappeared using the same procedure as 
mentioned above. Firstly, I examined the information of family 
members from 87 nuclear family units and extracted from them 
79 village couples who lived in the village before 1975. Then, I 
checked the number of units that had family members who had 
disappeared during the time. What was clear was that 59 of 87 
units were relevant (68 percent). In short, nearly 70 percent of 
village families who lived in the village in the 1970s had mem-
bers who were killed during the Pol Pot period. It is not possible 
to offer more detail in this short article; however, from the vil-
lage study, it was clear that most residents had both “victims” 
(the dead) and “victimizers” (“communists”) as close relatives and 
friends.
Going Beyond Dichotomies
Outsiders tend to assume and emphasize dichotomies such as 
“victims” and “victimizers” when they attempt to grasp the dif-
ference of experiences that may exist in one village. And this 
perception has, for sometime, formed the major framework for 
understanding Cambodian society. However, it is important to 
note that the label “victimizer” is not familiar to villagers. Today, 
the people recall their relatives and friends who participated in 
the communist activities without any sense of criticizing them as 
collaborators in the genocide. 
Certainty, there is the current presumption that local people 
do not express any criticism of individuals’ past behavior because 
very specific conditions in the research area produced a group 
of collaborators in the communist movement in the first half of 
the 1970s. This is armchair theory and does not hold any truth 
because it is much rarer to encounter vocal criticisms of others’ 
behavior during the Pol Pot period, although I did hear a few 
cases of collective killing of local cadres of Khmer Rouge which 
had occurred in the community just after the fall of the regime.
In regards to village life, Cambodian people do not view the 
multiple experiences they had during the Pol Pot regime as hav-
ing a fatal impact on social life. In interviews, there was no one 
who focused only on stories from this period. Instead, they dwelt 
on their lives before and after this time. This period forms only 
one part of the full spectrum of their lives. They decided to coex-
ist and live together in a community for over 30 years as a way of 
keeping communication with different Others/others as either 
neighbors or as friends. Therefore, we need to address people’s 
attitudes in terms of coexistence as a crucial part of the recon-
ciliation process in Cambodian society, instead of employing 
dichotomies that greatly simplify situations that are quite com-
plex and complicated. Analyzing the features of reconciliation of 
Cambodian villagers in regards to their everyday attitudes will 
yield insights into multiple experiences of coexistence, which in 
turn can expand our understanding of our human world.
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 A personal ad on a wall. Searching for a sister who went 
missing during the Pol Pot period (Taken by author at a 
photocopy shop in Pursat provincial town, September 
2011).
Wedding ceremony in the village. Young people born after 1979 accounted for the majority of the village 
population when the author started fieldwork (Taken by author in Kampong Thum province, December 
2000).
hen looking at present day urbanization in Hanoi and 
comparing it to its past incarnation an question arises. 
How was urbanization of Hanoi, Vietnam encouraged by France 
between 1873 to 1936? Answering this question and exploring 
urban transformation in Hanoi during the French colonial period 
(hereafter, Hanoi Project) has been a core research pillar in the 
area informatics project which we started in 2004. This project 
has aimed to create a new discipline called “area informatics,” 
(AI) an approach that integrates the interdisciplinary field of 
informatics with Area Studies, encompassing all academic dis-
ciplines. The Hanoi Project (FY2005-09 and FY2011-13) aims to 
explain the history of urban development in Hanoi - the capi-
tal of Vietnam for more than 1,000 years -, and digitize the re-
search process and results for publication. Through this project 
we are trying to explain the process of Hanoi’s urban develop-
ment and transformation based on the following hypothesis 
put forward by Sakurai Yumio:  “Through the continual filling in 
of lakes and ponds formed by the riverbed of the old Red River, 
Hanoi achieved significant urban development and transforma-
tion during the Nguyen Dynasty period” [Sakurai and Shibaya-
ma 2007: 37]. We have conducted further research in this area 
through a spatial analyses of various data gathered during the 
project. This has included maps, satellite images, cadastral maps, 
historic ruins and remains through using Geographical Informa-
tion Systems (GIS) and Remote Sensing (RS) technologies. Sub 
topics in our project, which made up 21 in total, are shown in Fig. 
1. Based on our AI approach, we have shed light on 10, three of 
which I would like to introduce below.
Putting Forward New Hypothesis: Urban Road Plan-
ning on the Isosceles Triangle
A practical development plan spanning approximately 15 years 
from the start of the French colonial period can be understood 
when we compare the 1890, 1898, and 1902 digital maps with 
a digital map taken in 2005. Looking carefully at the 1890 and 
1898 maps, the existing streets at that time and the planned 
streets are distinguished from each other and marked. Through 
employing GIS technologies to extract only the existing streets 
of that time and the planned routes, we were able to extract the 
development plan of the period and compare it on a timeline. 
Comparison between 1890 and 1898 reveals that several plans 
for street development on the south side of Thang Long cita-
del changed, and some streets planned disappeared by 1898, 
which can be considered to have been aborted. Moreover, the 
1898 map shows a plan for a straight street running diagonally 
from the west side of the citadel toward the south of Hoan Kiem 
lake along Dien Bien Phu Str., but this does not match the cur-
rent streets on the 2005 digital map, as shown in Fig. 2. Eventu-
ally, the planned street running obliquely downward from left to 
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Fig.1 Sub Topics in Hanoi Project; Center: Target Area and Landscape
  Change from 1885 to 2005 by 3D Modeling
Fig.2 Comparison of Planned Road in 1898 with Current Road in 2005
  [Source: Southeast Asian Studies 46(4): 501]
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right in the citadel in 1898 disappeared in 1902. This is sugges-
tive of another aborted plan. 
The question that arises here is why was the above plan 
in 1898 aborted in 1902? It might be possible to suggest that 
France was intending to urbanize Hanoi based on the shape of 
Paris, which was planned around the shape of star. The intersec-
tion with circles can be seen in points from (1) to (5) and two 
large isosceles triangles composed of (2)-(4)-(6) and (1)-(3)-(5) 
are clearly recognizable (Fig.3). As a result, the road plan be-
tween (2) and (3) as shown in 1890 was modified into Dien Bien 
Phu Str in order to be in symmetry with (3) to (4). The same plan 
can be seen in the southern center of Hanoi near the Bay Mau 
Lake and Kim Lien district (Fig.3). Such new findings were ob-
tained through the layer’s overlaying function for the historical 
maps using GIS.
New Findings on an Analysis of Micro-topographical 
Change       
Thang Long - Hanoi was established after moving the capital 
from Hoa Lu to Dai La in 1010. The wall of the citadel in Dai La 
can be considered as an enclosed area (in black) and is recog-
nized by its steep gradient (Fig.4). This result coincides with the 
hypothesis explained by historians so far. A birds-eye view of the 
landscape using 3D modeling is shown in Fig.5.
What is clear is that an analysis of micro-topographical 
change has introduced a difference of topographical change 
between 1950 and 2005 [See Yonezawa 2009]. Looking at Fig.6, 
we can upheaval and land subsidence visible in the orange, yel-
Fig.3  Urban Planning based on a shape of the Isosceles Triangle; The Circle in the intersection can be
  seen in (1) to (5) [Satellite Image: QuickBird 2005]
Fig.4  Micro-topographical Map with DEM(Digital Elevation Model)
 [Source: Yonezawa 2009]
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low, and green-shaded areas; higher in 2005 than in 1950. Two 
remarkable points emerge from what we can see in Fig. 6. One 
is that the elevation of the Great Dike is about 2 meter higher 
in 2005 than 1950 and the average height of the dike in 2005 is 
about 12 meters, compared to 10 in 1950. This difference shows 
that the dike has been raised since 1950 [See Yonezawa 2009].
Significant Urban Development and Transformation
From the results of various observations, this ongoing project 
suggests that ”significant urban development” took place be-
tween 1890 and 1900 and our conclusion rests on the following 
points. Firstly, changes took place in Thang Long citadel: there 
was an increase of military plants and barracks that can be seen 
by comparing the digital maps of 1885, 1890, and 1902. This re-
sult supports the hypothesis generated by Sakurai. Second is the 
transformations that took place in the old quarter: the continual 
filling in of ponds and marshes expanded in the same period. In 
particular, the citadel walls and moat were clearly destroyed by 
French and a railway line was constructed along with the east 
side of the citadel. The third is urbanization on the southern side 
of the citadel: Observations and comparisons of the three maps 
of 1885, 1898, and 1902 revealed that the French tried to initi-
ate several urban development plans. Such developments rap-
idly progressed westward from the west bank of the Red River 
to the south side of Hoan Kiem lake and Thang Long citadel, 
together with the settlement of new villages on the river bank. 
These developments also continued during the same period. 
Concurrently, the area near Bay Mau lake and Kim Lien district 
were developed after the start of the 20th century, because the 
1902 map shows no development plans there. Finally, there are 
changes to the gates positioned at the border of Thang Long 
area: All 15 shown in the historical map in 1873 and the map of 
1885 had clearly disappeared by 1902. We conclude that the dis-
appearance was caused by the development of new roads and 
residential areas in the same period.
Our remaining task is to investigate the village transition in 
the latter part of the 19th century and the transformation of Ha-
noi including local communities and human behavior after the 
year 1900 by means of an AI approach. With our future research 
we hope to use our innovative methods to explore new para-
digms in interdisciplinary Areas Studies.  
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Fig.5  3D Modeling based on DEM [Source: Yonezawa 2009]
Fig.6 Difference of DEM (2005 and 1950)  [Source: Yonezawa 2009]
 Map (1:2,000) overlaid with difference of DEM.  The darker-shaded      
area is lower in 2005 than 1950.
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nce envisioned as the premier shopping district in Penang, 
Komtar remains a landmark even after losing its luster as 
the local hub for leisure, entertainment and shopping. Over the 
years, as Malaysians opted for other more upscale shopping cen-
ters such as Gurney or Queensbay, the area evolved as a popular 
hangout for migrant workers from the Philippines, Burma, Indo-
nesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, among other nationalities working in 
the state. Still a central location, which also contains government 
offices, a bus terminal, and the tallest building in Penang, Kom-
tar today is also emerging as a globalized, ghettoized arena that 
provides space for non-Malaysian segments of the population 
living and working in the area. 
A destination frequented by foreigners, but certainly not 
your typical tourist spot, this part of Komtar reveals a grimier 
side of the global, highlights the distinction between Malaysians 
and foreign workers, and demonstrates a general attitude to-
wards migrant labor. There’s a pronounced difference between 
local residents and migrant workers, even in the way they view 
Komtar. While foreign workers would say, “See you in Komtar, 
where else?” some Malaysians would ask me, “why do you keep 
going to Komtar? It’s dangerous and dirty.” 
For sure, Komtar today hardly represents the gleaming, 
sprawling image flaunted by soaring structures that we would 
associate with things global. The rundown main building has 
seen better days, where the corridors of shops that used to 
thrive with local business now sit empty and idle. Along some of 
these same aisles of previously abandoned commercial spaces, 
migrants have now set up shops, food stalls and other enterpris-
es patronized by their growing communities. A deserted com-
plex, revived and appropriated by migrants, Komtar now func-
tions more than just a space for local commerce; it has gradually 
and inadvertently transformed into a transnational, multiethnic 
shared space with economic, social, cultural and political dimen-
sions. 
A Transnational Space for Globalization’s Rank and File
Contrary to its reputation, a depiction blown up by reports of 
petty crime and theft, police busts and crackdowns, inside Kom-
tar there is an implicit, well-organized order, where the zoning 
and containment stance toward migrant workers can somehow 
be gleaned from the placement of various sections that have 
been carved out by different migrant groupings. Hidden away in 
some awkward corners on the first level, the Nepalese canteen 
Dewi Global Ganga provides Nepalese utility workers and shop 
hands a place to meet, where they eat curry and momos, and en-
joy drinks while listening to music from Kathmandu. Here, they 
It can be said that the spaces that migrants roam in somehow reflect the state of foreign workers 
in a given area, the conditions they face, and how they contend with these despite their limitations. 
Places such as Kota Raya in Malaysia, Lucky Plaza in Singapore and Victoria Park in Hong Kong 
provide an evolving spatial metaphor that captures everyday negotiated practices carried out by 
migrant workers as they make room for themselves in their host locales, straddle transnational re-
alities and navigate through global disparities. In Penang, Malaysia, Kompleks Tun Abdul Razak 
(KOMTAR) accommodates a neatly compartmentalized tapestry of different worlds, converging in 
a shared, borrowed space. This space is shaped by local impetus, a national policy of containment 
and regulation, and localized transnational activity that speaks of family ties, nurturing communi-
ties, and relations across borders. It also consists of small, segmented pockets of ‘deterritorialized na-
tions,’ annexes of home, transplanted and tucked away in designated corners that migrants claim 
and maintain for their own uses.
THE (NON) CITIZENS OF KOMTAR
Reflections on Migrant Worker Spaces and
Expressions of Community and Agency
Aya Fabros
Research Associate, Focus on the Global South
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A Komtar food spot, popular among for foreign workers from Burma, showcases 
posters of famous icons including Pantera, the Beatles and Aung Saan Suu Kyi
er subjects in the Malaysian migration milieu. All these people 
inhabit the in-between spaces that lie within those two poles, 
comprising of the citizen on one end, and the non-citizen, on the 
other. 
In Malaysia, it is estimated that 1 out of 4 workers is pekerja 
asing, a migrant worker.  According to the Immigration Office, 
1.649 Million foreign workers were issued with working permits 
in 2010 (as of November). They work in manufacturing (39%), 
plantations (14.9%), in construction sites (13.9%), in services 
(9.5%), agriculture (9%) and households (13.8%). Documented 
foreign workers mainly come from various parts of Asia— In-
donesia (43%), Bangladesh (18.2%), Nepal (13.7%) Myanmar 
(8.8%), India (5.2)%, Vietnam (2.8%), Pakistan (1.6%), Philippines 
(1.8%), Cambodia (2.7%), and others (1.8%). On top of this huge 
number of registered workers, there are also an estimated 2 mil-
lion irregular workers, in effect, doubling the size of the foreign 
worker population. 
In Penang, data coming from the Immigration Department 
shows 126,135 registered foreign workers in 2010, flowing in 
from Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand, India, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, all primarily employed 
as laborers in factories, shop hands in the service sector and do-
mestic workers in households. 
Undervalued, Neglected, Invisible
Despite their large, ever growing numbers, and Malaysia’s 
apparent reliance on them, foreign laborers generally remain 
undervalued, neglected, and invisible. Marked as non-citizens of 
Malaysia, accorded  limited rights and entitlements, and relegat-
ed to a transitory and peripheral location in a larger sociopoliti-
cal space, many of Malaysia’s migrant workers are constructed as 
mere visiting, laboring bodies. They are tied to their employers 
and bound to their jobs by virtue of work permits that specifical-
spend their breaks, lunches, or days off, talking to compatriots 
in their mother tongue, reading the paper or even exchanging 
news from home. Up in the main building on the second level, 
the Burma section of Komtar houses an internet café, several 
small canteens and dry goods stores, a travel agency and a vol-
unteer office. Many signs along the corridors are written out in 
their script, while the shops hang posters of popular stars and 
important icons from Burma, including Aung Saan Suu Kyi and 
her father. On the third floor, you find an Indonesian nook of 
satays and batiks, and then, on the next level the Filipino area, 
where along the rows of empty commercial spaces you find LBC, 
a remittance center, karaoke and dining places, a Filipino prod-
ucts store, and  a Filipino-run internet café.
While groups largely keep to themselves, they do have a 
sense where the others are, with the layout perhaps implying 
an acknowledged unspoken order. It’s sort of a systematized 
smorgasbord of various things Asian— where one can find ba-
tik, bagoong and Burmese publications offering the latest news 
on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, among other things, a hidden 
dimension of what makes “Malaysia truly Asia” as the country 
continues to draw in successive streams of migration. Although 
still not a widely recognized focal point such as the Chinatowns 
or Little Indias elsewhere, once you enter and walk around, it be-
comes more and more obvious you are stepping into a space 
that is not only regional but also clearly transnational, where 
interactions that traverse borders are carried out and sustained; 
where globalization’s rank and file retreats and congregates.
Malaysia’s Migration Regime 
Many of today’s Komtar ‘regulars’ are minorities and transients—
including the migrant laborer, as well as the occasional ‘tourist’ 
and ‘overstayer’, the runaway, the UNHCR card holder, the un-
documented, ‘paperless’ (walang papel) and ‘illegals’, among oth-
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Nepalese utility workers and migrants frequent this small restaurant, which serves familiar dishes from “home.”
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ly indicate the name of their employer, their sector and industry, 
along with practically absolute discretion of employers to grant 
or cancel these documents. The unevenness of this scheme is 
pointed out by one worker who told me, “they can dictate and 
change the terms of employment, pick and sack workers as they 
please, but we cannot choose employers or simply leave even 
when we are clearly disadvantaged.” 
Depicted as rigid and overly regulated, Malaysia’s migrant 
worker regime has been described as resembling conditions of 
indentured work, where foreign workers are essentially thrust 
into a form of bonded labor conveniently enshrined in law. For 
this multitude of ‘low-skilled’ foreign workers, their non-citizen-
ship (that which limits their recognition and equal access to 
rights, protection, services and entitlements), prohibits them 
from having a say on the terms of their stay and work conditions, 
decrees their subjection to heavier regulation and also consti-
tutes them as ‘valuable’ workers, justifying lower wages, longer 
work hours, restricted mobility, harsh working conditions and 
poor living situations. 
While workers concede that they came to Malaysia “to work,” 
some will also express that their situation is “parang walang laya” 
(it’s like we don’t have freedom), working “as if we were slaves 
from old times”.  Traveling far in search of employment, many for-
eign workers contend with restricted movement and freedoms 
upon arrival, confined to their workplaces and employer-man-
aged living spaces, thrust into a position where they are practi-
cally isolated from others and heavily dependent on employers, 
many of whom would not hesitate to take their workers’ pass-
ports or threaten them with deportation to keep them passive 
and compliant. Disciplined to docility by a combination of intim-
idation, desperation and isolation, many workers consequently 
find themselves in a situation that also renders them vulnerable 
to abuse and exploitation within the workplace and beyond.   
An Agora for Workers in Diaspora
Contending with the restrictions and regulations of non-citizen-
ship outside, in Komtar, migrants appear to reclaim a sense of citi-
zenship and agency. Here, they are not mere workers stripped of 
their identities, treated  as cogs in manufacturing assembly lines 
or servants in shops and households. In this space, they are also 
Filipinos or Burmese or Nepalese, and not simply the Other, an im-
posed categorization whereby Filipino means ‘maid’ and Burmese 
means ‘illegal.’  Here, they are customers consuming their choice 
products; they are caring family members sending home their 
hard earned pay; they are compatriots and friends taking part 
in celebrating successes; extending sympathy and support; and 
exchanging opinions about their day-to-day travails or chronic 
“national issues”. 
Within the vicinity of Komtar, workers come to send money 
back home through remittance centers. They purchase goods 
from shops that sell an assortment of medicine, food items, toi-
letries, reading materials and other products imported from their 
countries of origin. They come to eat in the small canteens that of-
fer ‘home-style’ meals reminiscent of shared dishes from their own 
villages and towns. They surf the net and chat, link up with their 
families and friends left behind, through Facebook and Yahoo. 
They get their hair, brows and nails done, pamper themselves with 
foot and back massages, rejuvenating for another week of non-
stop work. They take part in broad-daylight, 2 pm ‘disco,’  squeez-
ing in some fun before their 7 pm curfew. They throw parties to 
celebrate a birthday, or on days off, drink and listen to music or 
sing karaoke. They practice presentations for church, plan activi-
ties, prepare decorations and post announcements, updates and 
invitations, all of which bear the imprint of an emerging sense of 
community. 
While migrant workers can be seen as appropriating unwant-
ed spaces, which locals normally snub for being “dangerous and 
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A lorry for transporting arrested migrant workers in Kuala Lumpur presents a familiar and stark image associated with the Malaysian migration regime, known for its 
raids, check points and crack downs on undocumented foreigners.
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dirty,” migrants are nonetheless constantly reminded of their place, 
even in this area. Komtar landscape is also associated with almost 
regular raids and a fixed police and surveillance presence; where-
by migrant workers status and ‘place’ is essentially drilled in by 
crackdowns, round ups and other threats and disruptions posed. 
The message to migrants that they are only passing through, only 
here to work and not permitted to settle,  still echoes in the halls 
of Komtar. As such, this side of town tends to resonate with some 
kind of underground tag, also coinciding with an almost-blanket 
construction of migrants as undesirables and illegals. This  in turn 
is used to justify (and perpetuate) the treatment they receive and 
the limited rights and freedoms they are given. 
Nonetheless, the shop owners, mostly long-time residents 
and foreign spouses, would allude to a greater rationale for their 
enterprises, imputing added meaning to the space while empha-
sizing the importance of remaining in business, because other-
wise “where would they (migrant workers) go then?” 
At a coffee place downstairs, two young men compare newly 
issued cards from the UNHCR, while waiting for another com-
panion to take them to Alor Star where relatives and friends are 
detained. Upstairs, a makeshift table is set for a game of tongits, 
while in the next room, a Filipina domestic helper belts out a lively 
rendition of  “Top of the World” by the Carpenters. 
In Komtar, people linger on for hours and come even without 
the intention of buying anything. “ I come here to see others and 
relate with people,” one Filipina domestic worker tells me. “When 
you come to Malaysia, you are alone, you have no one, in Komtar 
somehow you do not feel that way,”  says another.
In this regard, Komtar somehow similarly functions as an ag-
ora for a polity in diaspora, where dispersed, atomized, individual 
workers, cut off from their homes, families and communities, are 
able to come together, meet and mingle. There is no encompass-
ing migrant collective consciousness per se nor an explicitly ar-
ticulated notion of common projects and aspirations, but within 
the different communities, a level of solidarity seems to be shared, 
nurtured and exercised in ways that at least fill the gaps left by 
their condition of non-citizenship. Those who are active in this pur-
suit stress the importance of having a physical space that workers 
know they can use and run to. This is what prompted some young 
migrant workers to set up a small office on the second floor to 
offer “volunteer funeral services” and hospitalization support to 
foreigners in need, deciding to formalize their organization after 
countless ad hoc cases of collecting funds, processing documents, 
and arranging rites for migrants who do not have access to these 
basic services. Other self-organized support groups provide relief 
and assistance to workers in distress, at the same time mobilizing 
compatriots around social and cultural activities that allow them 
to come together in maintaining and honoring shared values, tra-
ditions and practices while overseas.
Komtar is constantly abuzz with a certain degree of dynamism 
and activity, teeming with possibility, even without yet posing any 
direct challenge to this existing status quo and other deeply em-
bedded injustices migrant workers face. While enjoying and carv-
ing out their own tenuous nooks and crannies, migrant worker 
expressions underscore that they do not intend to threaten their 
employment and stay. They express a level of human agency, 
reclaim a sense of citizenship, and assert a sense of belonging, a 
right to be here. Even through some token symbolic presence and 
local imprint, these are nonetheless subtle articulations made in 
an uneven terrain that migrants carefully tread. For now, these ev-
eryday acts— seemingly mundane practices almost collectivized 
by common experience and amplified by sheer number— glare 
against conditions that would isolate or make migrant workers in-
visible and inconsequential. As these communities take root how-
ever, it will be exciting to observe how the spaces they engender 
will evolve and where deepening solidarities may lead. 
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A corridor of empty and vacated shops depicts a typical weekday at Komtar, which transforms into a bustling commercial center especially on Sundays, when most 
foreign workers take their day-off.
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Today is the O-bon holiday. Only the three of us are still 
working. Why [we] Cambodians have to work while the 
Japanese [may] have a holiday?” states an entry in a diary writ-
ten by a 27 year old Cambodian male migrant worker in Ja-
pan.1 He and his two country mates had been put to work as 
manual laborers in a supermarket chain in Fukuoka prefecture. 
This story only came to light after a police investigation and the 
subsequent crack down on what could be considered as human 
trafficking, as he and others were lured to work in Japan on the 
promise that they would be hired as IT staff. 
His case may be understood as a typical situation faced 
by millions of illegal migrants in our contemporary globalised 
world, regardless of their citizenship and the host country. The 
above case will most likely be buried away in official statistics 
under the category “illegal migrant”. However, his case marks a 
sharp contrast for general public, in particular for people in Ja-
pan who believe in the country’s modernization project for the 
welfare of the individual over the course of industrialization. 
This belief can only be juxtaposed with this particular Cambo-
dian migrant worker and the painstakingly detailed entries in 
his diary recording the miserable working condition he and his 
fellow workers had to face on a daily basis (even on the O-bon 
holiday) as an (illegal) migrant worker. That illegal migrants have 
been the pillars of modernizing Japan is not noteworthy, but the 
fact that he was keeping a diary is important not only as a sen-
sational attention-grabbing headline for the sale of newspapers. 
It highlights the sentiment shared among Japanese readers 
whose society has been struggling to humanize working condi-
tions since the postwar period.   
Migrant workers have been actively writing and sharing 
their stories. The conventional form of migrants’ written expres-
sion is letters to family members. Many Burmese and Laotian 
migrant workers in Thailand have used this form to convey their 
personal life stories of crisis, fear, hope and dreams [see Koet-
sawang 2001]. Filipino migrant workers also write letters to their 
family members to maintain personal communication, although 
mobile phones have now displaced the primacy of letter writ-
ing. Besides letters, some migrants take notes on things they see, 
hear, and experience during their time in abroad [See Ventura 
2006; 2007]. And, as in the case of this particular Cambodian 
migrant, migrants keep diaries as they often find consolation in 
keeping track of the entries. Migrant communication is normally 
meant as a private record, or if it is for limited circulation, usually 
only amongst friends or relatives.  
But migrants also write short stories. Wiset Sanmano [2006], 
a Laotian migrant working in a factory in Bangkok, has written 
an outstanding short story, not in his native tongue, but in very 
eloquent Thai2  –as if he were consciously discussing the migrant 
situation for a Thai audience.  Standing apart from letters and 
diary, the short story as a form of literature contains the author’s 
personal impressions, fantasy and worldview – elements that 
are part of our modern expression in creating a representation 
of social, political and personal realities.    
It is in this literary context of migrants’ writings that Indo-
nesian migrants are seriously engaging themselves by writing 
short stories (some are novels) to narrate their personal lives and 
experiences as migrants, for the public to read. Between 2006 
and 2010, there were more than a dozen collections of short 
stories and novels, as well as hundreds of poems published in 
national and local newspapers throughout Indonesia. Their writ-
ings document and raise issues on working conditions abroad 
from the perspective of a manual migrant worker working with-
in a global capitalist world. As Sanmano’s short story expresses, 
their works are sensible statements from migrants to the general 
public so that society can understand their vulnerability.  Inter-
estingly, all of these published narratives are written by women 
migrants who have worked in Hong Kong and Taiwan as domes-
tic helpers. In this way, their narratives differ from Sanmano’s 
writing which focuses on male characters (and are written from 
a male perspective). In a sense, their writing stems from their 
personal existence and experiences as female migrant workers. 
The feminization of labour is also a salient characteristic of 
migration from Indonesia to Hong Kong and Taiwan where the 
labor market is in need of cheap domestic workers and care-
givers for elderly. More than 70 percent of the officially docu-
mented Indonesian migrant workers annually are women. It is 
assumed that increasing migration of women might be attrib-
uted to the lack of employment opportunities at home and the 
need to earn better incomes. Yet, migrants’ narratives tell us dif-
ferent stories. Economic reason alone is not the only push factor 
for these women to take the risk of working abroad, given the 
nature of their domestic work, which is often characterized by 
a higher exposure to physical and sexual abuse from employ-
ers. Their written narratives provide an honest description of the 
complex and multifaceted reasons for migration, ranging from 
a passion for adventures, an escape from social duties in their 
society, forgetting past events (such as failed relationships and 
marital breakup), an aspiration for personal freedom, and so on. 
These in turn are all shaped by the conditions they have to face 
at home and the fantasy of having a problem-free life abroad. 
In that way, migrants’ written expressions not only offer a clear 
window to the real world of migrants as they experience and un-
derstand it, but also serves as a narrative for a change.
Maria Bo Niok, for examples, has written two novels, i.e.: 
Ranting Sakura (Sakura branches) [2007a] and Sumi: Jejak Cinta 
Perempuan Gila (Sumi: The Love Trail of A Mad Woman) [2008a], 
and one collection of short stories, Geliat Sang Kung Yan (Writh-
ers of the Kung Yan) [2007b]. Each takes its story from facts based 
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on her life and experience as a migrant worker. Maria Bo Niok is 
the nom de plume of Siti Mariam Ghozali. Born in 1966 in Wono-
sobo (Central Java), Ghozali had to do manual labour from an 
early age for a living. She used to run her own petty stall selling 
rice and birds in a traditional market in her hometown, and only 
after a painful divorce did she decide to try her luck to become 
a domestic worker in Hong Kong. Her first stint lasted for two 
years (1996-98), and after a short break, soon followed in Taiwan 
for two years (1998-2000), and once again in Hong Kong for four 
years (2001-05).  
Geliat Sang Kung Yan offers a very fascinating view of life 
abroad in Hong Kong from the perspective of a female migrant 
worker. It challenges our understanding of the agency of female 
migrant workers who are often depicted as poor, weak, illiter-
ate migrants, or defenseless victims of globalization – as in the 
case of the Cambodian migrant in Japan. Although working life 
as a domestic worker is hard and difficult, Geliat Sang Kung Yan 
provides a life that is full and yet complex, far from being pigeon-
holed into a single aberration. Its narratives are also entertain-
ing with clear expression of her sense of wit, and studded with 
jokes, satire and self-mockery. As these short stories entertain 
their readers, they empower fellow migrant workers as its read-
ers to find the courage to seek possibilities and to overcome any 
“problem”  they face as woman-migrant-workers. And this qual-
ity holds an important key for migrant workers to read these 
short stories written by their own fellows. 
A recent released movie, “Minggu Pagi di Victoria Park” (2010) 
also takes the life of a female migrant worker in Hong Kong as 
its storyline. The movie is a step forward by middle-class cinema 
artists attempting to bring up the situation of migrant workers 
before the Indonesian public – since migrants and their lives 
(amazingly and sadly!) have never entered the literary world 
as a subject or inspiration for middle-class writers in Indonesia. 
Nonetheless, it could never replace the significance of literary 
expression penned by the migrant workers themselves. And this 
leads us to acknowledge the political and cultural implications 
of their writings. The fact that migrant workers are now capable 
of speaking for and taking care of themselves, shows a mode of
 
independence; a capacity to articulate their interests as female 
migrants; and persistent efforts to defend themselves even 
though they are lacking support from many parts of their soci-
ety.
Short stories and novels penned by Indonesian migrant 
workers may inform similar readings of other forms of written 
expressions by fellow migrants from other Southeast Asian 
countries. These let us know of the ways in which migrants keep 
track of their own records as a means of communication among 
themselves as authors and readers –setting a different mode 
from oral tradition, that intensively captures the meanings of 
their journey and work as a migrant worker. And more impor-
tantly, they show us migrant’s self-efforts in overcoming their 
work-problems abroad and how they can gain more autonomy 
over their own lives. 
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he recent sensational discovery of two stones inscribed in 
the ancient Philippine baybayin script on Ticao island in the 
Visayas has generated a flurry of questions and speculations 
among Philippine scholars and in the popular imagination. A 
major Philippine television station has even done a few seg-
ments on the discovery and is currently putting together a more 
substantial documentary. These are the first stones inscribed 
with the clearly identifiable baybayin script to have ever been 
found in the Philippines. One of the stones is a roughly triangu-
lar slab measuring approximately 57 cm long, 44 cm wide and 
11 cm thick weighing around 30 kilos. The smaller stone is ob-
long in shape with dimensions of 20 x 18 cm and 6 cm thick. The 
larger slab has writing on both sides. The inscription on one side 
has 56 symbols while its opposite face has 86. The smaller stone 
has writing only on one side with a total of around 16 symbols. 
Some parts of the inscription on the large tablet have been dam-
aged and it is possible that parts of the stone may have broken 
off on both the left and right sides.
 The baybayin is a type of alphasyllabary or abugida writing 
system which ultimately traces its provenance, like the majority 
of Southeast Asian scripts, to Southern India. The word “baybay” 
for its part means “to spell” though it could also refer to “sea-
shore.” Each symbol in the script stands for a consonant com-
bined with a vowel with a default value of “a.” Depending on the 
position of a diacritical mark called “kudlit” above or below the 
symbol, it can be followed by an “e” or an “o.” The Tagalog bayba-
yin has a total of 17 symbols. The first European chroniclers who 
arrived in the Philippines such as Pedro Chirino and Antonio de 
Morga recorded the popular use of this script among the inhab-
itants of the archipelago. Indeed, one of the first books printed 
in the Philippines in Tagalog, the Doctrina Christiana (1593) was 
printed with a xylographic press in both roman and baybayin 
scripts. An attempt in 1620 by the Spanish friar, Francisco Lopez, 
to add a cross-shaped “virama” symbol, or vowel killer, in order to 
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facilitate the writing of independent consonants and make the 
reading of the script easier did not prevent the roman alphabet 
from eventually gaining dominance. Very few fragments, letters 
and signatures written on paper have survived to the present 
day. Philippine nationalists and revolutionaries in the 19th cen-
tury evinced a fascination with these early writings systems as 
proof of an advanced “pre-colonial” Philippine civilization. Today, 
the baybayin system does not have any widespread contempo-
rary use. Children are exposed to it only in the most perfunctory 
manner in schools and do not actually learn it. Perhaps its main 
use today is as a type of ornamental font used by various gov-
ernment and non-government organizations or even as logos 
for commercial enterprises. As part of a “cultural revivalism” of 
sorts in the digital domain, a “baybayin community” has sprung 
up in the Internet where mainly the artistic and cultural value 
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Close up of Babayin script on large stoned that was unearthed
of baybayin is celebrated by means of fonts, tattoos and other 
paraphernalia of interest to young Filipinos living in various 
parts of the world in search of their roots. Only the Mangyan and 
Tagbanua ethnic minorities continue to use their baybayin-type 
scripts as part of their persistent though increasingly endan-
gered writing traditions.
 The two stones had actually been dug up by elementary 
students within the grounds of the Rizal Elementary School lo-
cated in the municipality of Monreal on Ticao Island, Masbate 
more than 10 years ago (2000). During the intervening period, 
the stones had just been placed near the entrance of a class-
room and used to wipe the mud off the slippers and shoes of 
the students and teachers. It was only last April of this year that 
the new principal, Virgie Espares Almodal, realized the value of 
the stones for the community. She realized that these could be a 
source of pride among students who could be taught by means 
of these that their ancestors were not illiterates but possessed 
their own writings. Some grade school students were immedi-
ately put to work cleaning the stones. However, these untrained 
“restorers” unfortunately used a sharp metal implement (alleg-
edly a nail), to make the symbols “clearer.” Almodal then had the 
stones exhibited on a specially built stand in front of the school 
for a few weeks. It was only after some members of the commu-
nity had voiced concerns that the stones might be stolen were 
these taken down and deposited in a safer place.
 Prof. Francisco Datar, a native of nearby Magallanes, Sor-
sogon, was then contacted by a relative on the island who 
thought he might be interested in taking a look at the stones. 
Prof. Datar, who teaches at the Department of Anthropology at 
the University of the Philippines at Diliman, Quezon City, made 
a preliminary survey and immediately informed the Philippine 
National Museum about the find. He then quickly formed  the 
“UP Ticao, Masbate Anthropological Project Team” consisting 
mainly of his colleagues Prof. Ricardo Nolasco (Dept. of Linguis-
tics, UP Diliman), Arnold Azurin (UP Archeological Studies Pro-
gram), Ramon Guillermo (Department of Filipino and Philippine 
Literature, UP-Diliman) and Myfel Joseph Paluga (Department of 
Social Sciences, UP-Mindanao).
 Due to the problematic circumstances of discovery, it is only 
right that the scientific community should be guarded about is-
sues of authenticity surrounding the inscribed stones. However, 
it is still too early to make any definitive statement about these 
questions in either a positive or negative direction. More de-
tailed work still has to be done in order to clarify the various mys-
teries clouding the provenance of the stones and the nature of 
the actual inscriptions themselves. Very few artifacts have been 
discovered in the Philippines bearing evidence of the ancient 
scripts which were once said to have been widely used on the 
islands. Indeed, the lack of reliable information about another fa-
mous artifact with baybayin writing, the so-called Calatagan pot, 
which was discovered in 1961, has led to perennial and unre-
solved questions about its authenticity. Lingering doubts about 
the actual origin of the so-called Laguna Copperplate, dated 900 
AD, in Sanskrit and Javanese language and written in the Kawi 
writing system but found in Laguna Province of Luzon island, 
continue to persist. A more recent discovery, this time excavated 
in situ in an archeological site in Intramuros, Manila, is another 
pot with an inscription on the shoulder which seems to be in yet 
another still unknown script. Other objects with short fragments 
of text have also been found but have never been read due to 
the lack of knowledge about their seemingly sui generis scripts. 
Due to the paucity of baybayin samples from the ancient past, 
the field of palaeography has never been as developed in the 
Philippines as it has been in Indonesia which possesses a much 
richer store of ancient inscriptions on copper, stone and other 
materials.
 Fieldwork on Ticao island itself was conducted by the UP 
team a few weeks after Prof. Datar’s announcement of the dis-
covery. Dozens of interviews were conducted among commu-
nity members in order to cross-check and verify the accounts of 
the individuals directly involved in the discovery of the stones. 
Anthropological site mapping was done by Prof. Paluga of the vi-
cinity where the stones were said to have been found in order to 
look for traces of where dwellings may have existed in the past. 
Principal Virgie Almodal with the Stones
A page from the Doctrina Christiana  in Spanish and the Babayin script
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Finally, the team also strove to get as accurate as possible images 
of the writing in order to develop faithful transcriptions of the 
inscriptions. Prof. Datar also brought in a group of physicists led 
by Prof. Maricor Soriano who did 3-D imaging of the inscriptions 
in order to help settle some unresolved problems in transcrip-
tion and in order to make the most accurate possible record of 
the inscriptions.
 The results of the fieldwork have not yet uncovered any pri-
ma facie evidence pointing to the possibility that the inscribed 
stones are a hoax or a deliberate forgery. Therefore, the most 
pressing question which the researchers currently face are the 
probable dates of provenance of the inscribed stones.
 Some characteristics of the inscriptions such as the seem-
ing presence of spaces between words, the lack of vertical bars 
usually separating phrases and sentences in baybayin text, and 
the presence of diacritical marks with an outwardly similar ap-
pearance to the cross-shaped “virama” symbol introduced dur-
ing the Spanish era, seem to belie a pre- colonial origin. 
However, it might still be prudent to not immediately fore-
close such a possibility until the inscriptions themselves can be 
read and the ambiguous symbols and diacritical marks given 
more or less certain individual values. Several anomalous fea-
tures such as the apparent lack of diacritical marks on one side 
of the large tablet and perceptible divergences in character sets 
used in the inscriptions on the opposite faces of the large tablet 
raise even more questions. Were the two sides of the large stone 
slab inscribed by different persons at different times?  Is the in-
scription on the smaller stone contemporaneous with those on 
the large tablet or is it from another place and time? 20th or even 
20th century dates of provenance for the inscriptions might also 
not be out of the question.
Though there is as yet no complete proposed reading of the 
stones, some word-forms have been identified which strongly 
indicate that the stones may be written in a Visayan language 
with probable traces of the local Ticaonon language. Some 
word-forms which seem to surface in the text are apparent bor-
rowings from Malay and Javanese such as “bahaya” (danger) 
which in modern Visayan is “baya.” Other possible word-forms 
are “batahala” and “balahala” which are names for an ancient Vi-
sayan deity which in its original Javanese form is “barahala” but 
is rendered today as “bathala” in modern Visayan. Other possible 
word-forms in Visayan and the local language seem to point to a 
ritual or religious usage of the stones.
 If the style of the inscriptions and some lexical traits are tak-
en at face value, questions might be raised as to how a variant of 
the baybayin system very similar to the Tagalog system, with ap-
parent spacings between words and “virama”-looking diacritical 
marks arrived on the island of Ticao, Masbate? Moreover, how is 
it possible that it should contain ostensibly archaic lexical items 
of a seemingly non-Christian derivation (if these are indeed valid 
readings)? A theory which might account for these questions is 
a possible connection to 18th century religious revivalisms and 
so-called “nativist revolts” in the Visayas. However, the anthro-
pological and historical contextual frame of such a theory still 
has to be constructed, and this task must necessarily be accom-
plished around a plausible reading of the inscriptions that can 
overcome and explain their purported anomalous characteris-
tics. Other promising research directions must also be identified 
and pursued in a collaborative and interdisciplinary manner.
 However one cannot discount the possibility that the au-
thenticity of the “Baybayin Stones” of Ticao may never be re-
solved to the satisfaction of all parties. These may also turn out 
to be of a more recent origin than may be acceptable to those 
who wish for an earlier date in the distant past. Whatever may be 
the case, this discovery may jolt the Philippine scholarly commu-
nity to give more attention to developing baybayin studies with 
greater historical and anthropological depth. These inscribed 
stones may also provide certain new and exciting perspectives 
on the study of Visayan history. Finally, it might provide a chan-
nel through which young people and schoolchildren might 
learn more about their own history and culture.
 The UP Ticao-Masbate Anthropological Project Team, with 
some other invited speakers knowledgeable on the subject, 
discussed their preliminary results with a conference held on 
August 5-6, 2011 on the island itself. The other convenors of the 
conference are the Department of Education (Region 5), the Lo-
cal Government of Monreal, Masbate, the Masbate Provincial 
Government, the National Museum and 170+ Talaytayan MLE 
Incorporated. Another conference will also be held in Manila in 
the coming months.
Prof. Datar (left) and Prof. Ricardo Nolasco (right)
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dia, casinos have 
become one of the 
largest industries the country and are increasingly being seen as 
potential revenue generators for the State. The chief of casino 
management at the Ministry of Economy and Finance said that 
casinos in border towns located in Poipet, Banteay Meanchey 
Province near Thailand, and in Bavet near Vietnam had long 
proved profitable for Cambodia.1 In 2008, Cambodia earned 
US$19 million in tax from casinos yet there was a decline in 2009 
and 2010 from US$17 million and US$16 million due to a drop 
in tourist arrivals and a border dispute with Thailand. Only Poi-
pet border town, home to a number of casinos, located next to 
Aranyaprathet of Thailand, has a combined tax income of over 
US$7.5 to US$12.5 million (300 – 500 million baht) every year. 
This town is believed to be the largest gaming center in Asia. 
Travelling from Phnom Penh through the Southern corridor2 
(Road no. 1) to Cambodia-Vietnam border, there are 32 casinos 
in the whole country. Interestingly, 9-10 small to large scale ca-
sinos are located in Bavet on this corridor. Bavet used to be one 
of the poorest provinces of Cambodia but casinos now form one 
of the most important sources of income for the town. This has 
seen Bavet transform into a fast growing entertainment centre, 
and is now the second largest casino center after Poipet.
Bavet is fast becoming the home of casinos in the region 
for the following reasons. First, Bavet, is around 90 km from Ho 
Chi Minh City, and located in the Southern Corridor (connect-
ing Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City) where the movement of 
people, including tourists and gamblers is high. Its location as a 
border town makes it easy for Vietnamese to access, crossing the 
border with facilities offered by the casinos, such as comfortable 
vans. Secondly, the “Moc Bai Economic Zone,” an area just across 
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he Mekong sub-region covers 2.6 million square km, and has 
a combined population of around 326 million. It covers Thai-
land, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and southern China 
(Yunnan and Quang si). The region is rich with natural resources, 
such as timber, minerals, coal, oil and gas and abundant water 
resources support agriculture and fisheries providing energy in 
the form of hydropower. These resources remain relatively un-
derused.
In the early of 1990’s, no one envisaged that connectivity 
within the Mekong sub-region would become a reality. Yet, it 
did so after politic turbulence in Cambodia subsided with sub-
sequent elections held in 1993. In no less than 10 years after the 
election, investment in infrastructure took place; roads, and in 
particular bridges, were gradually upgraded or built, leading to 
the realization of regional connectivity.
While connectivity means connecting one area or one 
country to another by mean of infrastructure (roads, bridges, 
transportation), it also means connecting economically, through 
trade, tourism and investment. It also means people in one area 
or country become linked to other areas in the Mekong sub-re-
gion, including those outside of it. This has led to a substantial 
cultural exchange among people within and outside the sub-
region. 
Infrastructure development is a key element in the overall 
development in the region and it has gradually seen improve-
ment and expansion. In particular, it has been the transport 
corridors which have operated as the chief means of achieving 
connectivity. The overall objective of infrastructure develop-
ment has been to transform these transport corridors into fully 
fledged economic corridors that invigorate trade, investment, 
tourism, etc. This brings about multiple benefits of improved 
transport linkages which are expected to reach remote, land-
locked areas in the sub-region.
What is clear is that this infrastructure development has fa-
cilitated cross border trade, investment and tourism along the 
economic corridors. This has also spread along smaller routes 
in the sub-region, facilitating the development of border towns 
and other economic zones as well as encouraging the increasing 
mobility of people, as well as outward movement. 
However, at the same time, infrastructure development has fa-
cilitated illicit or unethical activities in the sub-region, such as 
drugs trafficking, human trafficking, labor migration (illegal), the 
smuggling of goods, and prostitution along these newly open-
ing roads. And some of these border towns have been witness to 
the rise of a new economic phenomenon: casinos. Though not 
illegal in some countries, they do pose a kind of threat to human 
security and safety as will be discussed shortly. Parallel to roads 
and transport development, border towns in some countries, 
such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, have undergone intense 
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the border to Vietnam from Bavet, has also been developed. 
A huge duty free hypermarket has sprung up with a variety of 
goods from many countries, such as the US, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Japan, etc., and it attracts a large number of Vietnamese from Ho 
Chi Minh City and other provinces in the Mekong Delta. Some 
gamblers can combine the trip to the casino and hypermarket 
at the same time, and tourists who mainly came for shopping, 
can try their luck in the casino as well. Finally, the casinos in Ba-
vet and in other town bordering Vietnam attract Vietnamese 
gamblers who are prohibited from entering local casinos in their 
country as Vietnamese casinos are only open to foreigners and 
overseas Vietnamese. The Cambodian government has seen a 
great opportunity to attract Vietnamese gamblers whose econ-
omy is growing fast; these new consumers are ready to take risks 
to loose their money in gambling through their desire to win.
Kith Thieng, the owner of the US$100 million Titan King 
Casino in Bavet said Vietnamese gamblers are their prime tar-
gets. The Titan King Casino, one of the largest casinos, opened 
in February 2010 and is less than 1 km from the Bavet border 
gate. Facilities offered by casinos are very attractive to the gam-
blers. Regular gamblers from Vietnam (mostly the Vietnamese) 
especially in Bavet area will get free pickups and VIP cards com-
ing with free meals and, in some cases, gamblers will receive free 
accommodation. Moreover, in general, most casinos in Bavet as 
well as Cambodia offer private tables and VIP rooms for those 
wishing to bet large amounts of money.
Through observing some casinos in Bavet, I found out that 
almost all gamblers were Vietnamese and interestingly the ma-
jority of them women. Most of them come from Ho Chi Minh 
City, some from the province in Mekong Delta, such as Tay Ninh 
(a province sharing border with Cambodia), Can Tho which is lo-
cated in the centre of the delta, and other provinces. In particu-
lar, Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho are the provinces where the 
economy is growing the fastest.  
The Vietnam-Cambodia border in the extreme south-west 
of Vietnam, also hosts the “Ha Tien Vegas Casino” which is Kam-
pot’s first casino with an impressive nine storeys. Opened in Sep-
tember 2010, it is now becoming increasingly popular, as more 
and more tourists use the Preak Chak-Xa Xia border gates to 
enter and exit Cambodia. It is conveniently located not far from 
Preak Chak border gate in Kampot province which is opposite 
the Xa Xia border gate in Ha Tien, Kien Giang province. These 
border gates are not far from the Vietnamese Phu Quoc Island, 
situated in the Gulf of Thailand, which has also become increas-
ingly popular as the Vietnamese government tries to promote it 
as the most attractive tourist spot in the Gulf. A number of tour-
ists who visit the island can cross the border to visit or participate 
in gambling at Ha Tien Vegas Casino. 
The first US$2 million casino, Top Diamond Casino, was also 
opened on 21 January 2010 in a special economic zone (SEZ)3 
which lies on the border between Cambodia and Vietnam, in 
Phnom Den, Takeo province in Cambodia. This area is bordering 
An Giang province of Vietnam. The casino has been constructed 
about 1 km from the international border check point of Viet-
nam ‘Tinh Bien’.  There is also a plan to build a new US$4.5 million 
three-star hotel soon in Phnom Den SEZ. These facilities aim to 
increasingly attract potential Vietnamese gamblers.
An Giang, a populated province, connects to Can Tho which 
is considered as a centre of Mekong Delta where the economy 
is well developed. The chief of police at the Phnom Den Inter-
national checkpoint, has said that the number of tourists who 
entered Cambodia through this crossing have remained stable 
despite the world financial crisis. Around 80 to 100 tourists (offi-
cially) crossed the border every day in 2010, a figure that remains 
unchanged from 2009. He hopes that it will increase due to the 
new casino that will open.
Another spot lying on the Cambodia-Vietnam border where 
we can find at least 2 casinos, is in Chrey Thum village in Koh 
Thum district in Kandal province, 80 km from Phnom Penh and 
160 km from Ho Chi Minh City. This area is situated not far from 
Chrey Thum-Khanh Binh border gates4 which is separated by a 
small Binh Di waterway and can be reached by road no. 21 in 
Cambodia. Opposite to the casino complex, Long Binh big mar-
ket is situated in Vietnam.  This market is in a village of the An Phu 
district of An Giang province and supplies goods and commodi-
ties to both Vietnamese and Cambodian local people, as well as 
goods and agricultural products to casinos. Situated in this area, 
the casino can attract Vietnamese traders and businessmen 
from Vietnam who form the majority of gamblers. As this area 
is only 80 km from Phnom Penh, gamblers from the capital can 
visit easily, mostly on weekends and holidays. The casinos are 
only a few hundred meters from the Khanh Binh border gate. 
More than 100 Vietnamese arrive there every day, according to 
the employee in Crown Casino (Chrey Thum).
Impact on Human Security and Safety 
However, one of the unfortunate side effects of gambling is that 
an uncountable number of gamblers have lost money and fall-
en into debt. This may include the forfeiture of properties, cars, 
homes and land leading to conflict within the family and di-
vorce. The conflict has cost lives in some cases where a wife tried 
to kill her husband who refused to pay her debts brought about 
by the gambling. This is the case in Long An, southern Vietnam. 
Tran Thuy Lieu lost over 1 billion dong (US$47,000) during 22 
gambling trips to Cambodia at the end of December 2010. She 
urged Le Hoang Hung, her husband, to sell their house to pay 
her gambling debts, but he refused. So she set him on fire while 
he was asleep in his bed leading to his death 10 days later.5 
Duty free hypermarket at Moc Bai border gate,
Tay Ninh province in Vietnam
Photo by Thanyathip Sripana
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Gamblers who lose may be accompanied by staff of the 
casino to their residence in order to claim the debt from the 
gamblers’ family. Some anecdotal stories say state that some 
Vietnamese who lost in a casino in Bavet were asked to give one 
kidney when they did not have money to pay back debts.6 This 
information has yet to be verified. There is also information say-
ing that the winners with a big sum of money face the risk of 
being murdered when they have already left casino. This has 
happened in the case of some casinos in Poipet in Cambodia,7 
Savannakhet8 and Luangnamtha in the north of Laos. 
While infrastructure development facilitates connectivity in 
the sub-region, improved transportation facilitates the mobility 
of gamblers as well. A long bridge connecting road no. 1 in Neak 
Luong is being built (funded by Japan) in 2012 and is projected 
to completed by 2015. It is supposed to be the longest bridge in 
Cambodia and will certainly facilitate the mobility of people and 
goods, as well as investment and tourism. Furthermore, it will fa-
cilitate the travel of tourists who want to cross the border to Ho 
Chi Minh City and vice versa. Some of them may stop at casinos 
in Bavet and enjoy gambling. Moreover, it would certainly facili-
tate the trip of the gamblers from Phnom Penh or elsewhere to 
Bavet. 
Infrastructure development, in particular that of roads and 
bridges, is one of the major factors that facilitates the movement 
of tourists and gamblers. In another part of the sub-region, an-
other bridge is currently scheduled to open in November 2011 
and will stretch across the Mekong River between Nakhon Pha-
nom (Thailand) and Tha Khek (Laos) and a casino is supposed 
to open afterward in Tha Khek. It aims to attract Thai gamblers 
from many provinces in Thailand as in the case of Savan Vegas 
Casino in Savannakhet in Laos which was opened in 2008 after 
the opening of the bridge across Mekong river.
Though infrastructure development is not the prime cause 
of the spread of casino operations, it does facilitate easy access 
to these complexes. At the same time, this leads to attendant is-
sues such as the mobility of various illicit activities, which can be 
considered a threat to human security and the livelihood of peo-
ple in the areas. This requires further research to see how casinos 
transform border zones in what is a rapidly transforming area. 
Notes
1 Bavet is the name of an international border gate and a border 
town in Svay Rieng province, Cambodia. Moc Bai Bavet is the 
name of an international border gate and a border town in Tay 
Ninh province, Vietnam.
2 The Southern Corridor runs from Dawei on the Myanmar coast, 
then through Bangkok , then through the Thailand-Cambodia 
border at Aranyaprathet-Poipet. From this point, it seperates 
into two routes. The first one goes eastward through Siem Reap, 
Stung Treng and then through the border with Viet Nam and 
onward to Quy Nhon. The second route is from Aranyaprathet-
Poipet to Phnom Penh, to Ho Chi Minh City, and extends to 
Vung Tau.
3 Construction in the Phnom Den SEZ is expected to finish in 
2015.
4 Khanh Binh border gate is in An Giang Province, Vietnam.
5 Discussion with people from Ho Chi Minh City; and see, “Viet-
nam: wife set journalist husband on fire,” China Daily, February 
22, 2011, (Accessed 1 August, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/world/2011-02/23/content_12066912.htm; “Detention 
extended for journalist-torching wife,” Tuoi Tre News, June 30, 
2011, (Accessed 1 August, 2011) http://tuoitrenews.vn/cmlink/
tuoitrenews/society/detention-extended-for-journalist-torch-
ing-wife-1.35639.
6 Discussion with people from Ho Chi Minh City; and see, Quoc 
Quang and Minh Dung, “Ladies and gambling tragedies,” July 
4, 2011, (Accessed 20 July, 2011) http://english.vietnamnet.vn/
en/special-report/5168/ladies-and-gambling-tragedies.html.
7 According to some people in Aranyaprethet district, Sakaeo 
province. 
8  According to some people in Mukdahan, Nakhon Phanom.
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Goods traveling from Vietnam to Cambodia. This is in the neutral zone between Bavet and Moc Bai border gates.  Photo by Thanyathip Sripana
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n 11-12 February 2011, Kyoto University and the Kyoto 
Union Club (KUC) an alumni organization based in Thailand 
and made up of mainly Thai alumni who were at Kyoto Univer-
sity, held a joint Kyoto University Southeast Asian Forum at the 
Mandarin Hotel in central Bangkok. On the 11th, an annual party 
was held at the Bangkok Liaison Offic for the Centre for South-
east Asian Studies whereby former alumni gathered to talk and 
exchange ideas. Former President of Kyoto University Oike Ka-
zuo gave a toast and the present Executive Vice President Shiota 
Kohei offered greetings to all present. Also present were the 
President of the Japanese Alumni Association, Sonoda Mitsuhiro 
as well as the President of KUC, Sucharit Koontanakulvong. 
On this occasion, the forum played host to an important 
theme “What to do and not to do during an Earthquake.” This 
theme was all the more salient considering that Japan was 
struck by one of the deadliest earthquakes in living history, the 
“Great East Japan Earthquake” on 11 March 2011. All presenta-
tions dealt with the topic of Earthquakes and how Thailand can 
be prepared for them. Former President Oike, gave a thought 
provoking discussion on the comparative severity of earthquake 
mechanisms focusing on Japan and Thailand. In his presenta-
tion he offered a detailed overview of the historical overviews 
of earthquakes in Japan and how the historical documentation 
of seismic activity has helped in reconstructing past seismic his-
torical events. The message from this presentation was the im-
portance of integrating disaster risk reduction in a coordinated 
manner to alleviate the threat of disasters, offer regional tsunami 
disaster risk assessment as well as mitigation strategies. Other 
presentations, focused on seismic resistant design overviews 
(Prof. Panitan Lukkunaprasit), underground structures under 
earthquake loading (Dr.  Wanchai Teparaksa), the effects of earth-
quakes on underground structures (Suchatvee Suwansawat, 
President of Thailand Underground and Tunneling Group), the 
safety of Dams (Mr. Veerachai Cahaisrakaew, Assistant Director, 
Civil Maintenance Department), and the extension of the MRT 
Purple Line Project in Bangkok. The session was closed with final 
concluding remarks from Shimizu Hiromu, the Director of the 
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. Overall, the 
event was a success and will continue to play a role in strength-
ening ties between Kyoto University and institutions, networks 
and associations in Southeast Asia. 
Participants listening to discussion at the Forum
O
SEAS is accepting applicants semiannually for about 14 
positions for scholars and researchers who work on South-
east Asia, or any one of the countries in that region, to spend 
3 to 12 months in Kyoto to conduct research, write, or pursue 
other scholarly activities in connection with their field of study. 
Since 1975, more than 270 distinguished scholars have availed 
themselves of the Center’s considerable scholarly resources and 
enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of scenic Kyoto, the an-
cient capital of Japan and the main repository of the country’s 
cultural treasures, to pursue their interests in Southeast Asian 
Area Studies. The Center’s multi-disciplinary character and the 
diverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting scholars an 
ideal opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the cultivation 
of comparative perspectives. The highly competitive selection 
process has brought to the Center in recent years researchers 
from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China, Korea, and 
western countries including the United States and France. The 
visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study 
of Southeast Asia, and their official posts in their home institu-
tions include teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, and NGO 
worker. Information and Technology (IT) experts who conduct 
research on Southeast Asia are also joining the Center, not only 
to manage various database systems but also to construct aca-
demic networks for area study throughout the world. Successful 
applicants receive an appropriate stipend to cover international 
travel, housing, and living expenses in Kyoto. Research funds will 
also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will also be al-
located for domestic travel, subject to government regulations, 
and a number of other facilities are available to visiting scholars. 
Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto for the duration of 
their fellowship period. Fellows are normally invited to deliver a 
public lecture during their term at the Center and encouraged 
to submit an article for possible publication in the Center’s quar-
terly journal, Southeast Asian Studies and to contribute to the on-
line journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. CSEAS also received 
researchers, both Japanese and foreign, who visit on their own 
funds or on external fellowships.
International Visiting Scholars 
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Djawad, Muhammad Iqbal 07.01.2011~12.31.2011
Milner, Anthony Crothers 08.01.2011~11.30.2011
Professor, Rice Specialization, Hmawbi 
Campus, Yezin Agricultural University
Assistant Training Department Chief for 
Technical (ATDC/T), Training Department,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
Librarian (Head Circulation), Circulation 
Department, Central Library, King Mongkut’s 
University of Technology
Editor, Indonesian Service of Radio Netherlands
Associate Professor, Faculty of Marine Science 
and Fisheries, Hasanuddin University
Professor of Asian History, College of Asia and 
the Pacific, Australian National University
Concept and Practices of Agricultural Extension in 
Myanmar
Community-base Coastal Fisheries Management in 
Southeast Asia
Study of Cataloging-in-Publication Data for Translitera-
tion in Asian : Pilot Study in Thailan
Facism in Dutch East Indies and the Origin of Suharto’s 
Dictatorship
Climate Change Adaptation of Aquaculture In Eastern 
Part of Indonesia
A Historical /Anthropological Study of 1890s Pahang
C
List of Visiting Research Fellows, Visiting Researchers, and Visiting Project Researchers at CSEAS
Visiting Scholars with Faculty members at a get-together. Oct 2011
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Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (In English) No. 21
Bangsa and Umma: Development of People-grouping Concepts in Islamized 
Southeast Asia 
Edited by Yamamoto Hiroyuki, Anthony Milner, Kawashima Midori and Arai Kazuhiro. 2011.
Kyoto University Press
Having experienced a large-scale reorganization of social order over the past deade, the people of the Malay 
world have struggled to position themselves. They have been classified - and have classified themselves - with 
categories as bangsa (nation/ethnic group) and umma (Islamic network). In connection with these key concepts, 
this study explores a variety of dimensions of these and other ‘people-grouping’ classifications, which also include 
Malayu, Jawi, and Paranakan. The book examines how these categories played a significant part in the colonial 
and post-colonial periods in areas ranging from Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It demonstrates the 
extent to which shifting social conditions interact with the contours of group identity. This is a collaborative work 
by scholars based in the US, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia. 
Publications News
Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) No. 24
Fishing and Subsistence Strategies in the Celebes Sea:
Ethno-Archaeological  Approach to Area Studies
Ohno Rintaro, 2011. Kyoto University Press
This book investigates the history of marine exploitation and the development of subsistence strategies in the 
Celebes Sea as one of the maritime worlds that exist in Insular Southeast Asia. The Celebes Sea is a conceptual 
zone based on a historical and ecological background which includes Borneo Island in Malaysia, Mindanao Island 
in Philippines, and Sulawesi Island in Indonesia, together with two small islands groups, the Sulu Islands in Philip-
pines and Sangihe-Talaud Islands in Indonesia. The temporal framework of this book covers a period from the late 
Pleistocene to Holocene until present times (over 30,000 years), but mainly focuses after Neolithic times (about 
4,000 years) corresponding to the history of the Austronesian speaking people who are currently the major popu-
lation stretching across Insular Southeast Asia and Oceania.
Kyoto CSEAS Series on Asian Studies (In English)
Traveling Nation-Makers: Transnational Flows and Movements
in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia
Caroline S. Hau and Kasian Tejapira, eds. 2011.
Cross-border movements are often discussed as a high-level abstraction, but people cross borders as individuals. 
Their lives are reshaped by the experience, and in some cases they in turn reshape their own environment. For 
the ten individuals whose biographies appear in this volume, “travel” and its contingent and uneven processes 
of translation, circulation, and exchange helped forge patterns of political thought and action, and defined their 
contribution to the process of nation-making in Southeast Asia.  The accounts in this book discuss how travel 
shaped their lives and careers, and explain the transformative effects it had on the intellectual, political, and cul-
tural trajectories of nationalism, communism, Islamism, and other movements in the region. The volume illu-
minates some of the pathways by which people in this region worked to realize their intellectual, aesthetic and 
political visions and projects over the last tumultuous century.
Kyoto Area Studies on Asia (in Japanese) No. 23
Reconfiguring Cambodian Rural Villages
Kobayashi Satoru, 2011. Kyoto University Press
This book is a pioneering ethnographic study of Cambodian rural society after the rule of Democratic Kampuchea 
(1975-79). Based on long-term anthropological fieldwork in central Cambodia, the book uncovered the actual 
processes and conditions that informed socio-cultural reconfigurations of Cambodian rural villages after the tur-
moil of civil war and totalitarian state rule in the 1970s. The book describes, analyses and reconstructs regional 
history through local narratives which illustrate not only the unique characteristics of contemporary village lives 
but also the continuity and change of social structure and culture in Cambodia. 
he Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 
would like to announce the renewal of its website for its 
quarterly bilingual journal Southeast Asian Studies (SEAS). Pub-
lished since 1963 SEAS reflects the center’s principle of dedi-
cated fieldwork based, multidisciplinary, and contemporary ap-
proaches toward research. It publishes work from various fields 
of study on Southeast Asia, including the natural sciences, social 
sciences and humanities. The journal is rigorously peer-reviewed 
by a broad range of specialists, and also carries book reviews and 
special issues at least twice a year. Recent special issues have in-
cluded one reconsidering relations between Vietnam and Korea. 
This focused on how relations between both nations highlight 
complex layers of dynamism in East and Southeast Asian regions 
from perspectives that cannot be solely reduced to China and 
U.S. contexts. Other issues have also focused on important land-
use changes in the uplands of Southeast Asia, looking specifi-
cally at both the proximate and distant causes of change in Laos, 
including empirically based studies on forest policies, forest 
resource management, and agrarian transformations. We cur-
rently have a number of other special issues lined up. One looks 
at major socio-economic changes occurring during the last 40 
years in Tamil Nadu, India. This special issue will contextualize 
Announcing the Renewal of Southeast Asian Studies
(Kyoto University) Online Journal
high economic growth, changes in food production in the state 
as well as look at technological changes in agriculture and their 
impact on people’s livelihoods. Forthcoming issues for 2011 will 
deal with colonial transition in the Philippines and Indonesian 
and Filipino caregivers in Japan.
Always looking to stimulate interest and discussion on 
Southeast Asia, the journal has also recently introduced a new 
section, Themes and Perspectives, where leading scholars from 
their fields offer fresh, innovative and wide-ranging perspec-
tives of long term interest for Southeast Asia Specialist. At pres-
ent SEAS is also undergoing transition. As of 2012, SEAS will split 
into two versions: a Japanese version and a new English-lan-
guage international journal aimed at an international audience. 
We are currently accepting papers, and suggestions for special 
issues for the upcoming issues that will inaugurate this split. For 
authors who are interested in submitting unpublished articles or 
book reviews, or have ideas for special issues for our new journal, 
please contact us via the website below. Submissions, ideas and 
inquiries are accepted all year round. Access to the journal is free 
of charge and all our back issues have been digitized. All articles 





Earlier this year, a number of CSEAS faculty have won awards for 
research and works. Associate Professor Carolne Hau recieved 
the top prize in the Philippine Free Press Literary Awards for a 
short fictional work entitled Recuerdos de Patay (Memories of 
death). Assistant Professor Kobayashi Satoru also received the 
Daido Life Foundation Incentive Award for Area Studies for his 
contribution to Cambodian Studies. 
Carolline Hau’s trophy from  the  
Philippine Fress Press
A photo of the joint survey of temple-monasteries with  
young Cambodian researchers in Kampong Thum, Cam-
bodia
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